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1 Introduction 
 
This thesis will analyze the relationship between Norway and Russia in the High 
North, in relation to security policy and oil and gas cooperation. More precisely it will 
seek to examine whether, and how, potential oil and gas cooperation will affect the 
room of manoeuvre in the field of security politics for Norway and Russia.  
 
1.1 Background  
Norway and Russia share a common border in the High North. Despite the fact that the 
two countries are neighbours, they do not share many other similarities. Norway and 
Russia differ greatly in terms of language, history, culture, religion, economy and the 
political system. Another important variable is size, as Russia is much larger than 
Norway. Moreover, this concerns the political dimension as well. Whereas Norway is 
a medium-sized Western state, Russia is a Eurasian great power and a former Cold 
War super power. This lays the ground for differences in their foreign policy approach.  
 
Even though the two countries are very different from one another, traditionally they 
have had a peaceful relationship with each other, and it was not until the Cold War that 
the two countries began to perceive each other as enemies. Even then, this was due to 
the strained relationship between the free West and the communist East, rather than the 
bilateral relationship between Norway and Russia (Kjølberg 1997: 347). Today the 
situation seems quite different compared to the days of the Cold War, with less tension 
between the West and the East. This makes it possible for the countries to interact 
more freely and peacefully with one another, though Russia and Norway managed to 
interact peacefully on a number of issue areas even during the Cold War, when the 
relationship between the West and the East was at its most tense.  
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In 1977 Norway and the Soviet Union began drawing the borders of their exclusive 
economic zones. The borders marked the countries’ sovereign rights over the natural 
resources within 200 nautical miles from their coastlines. Problems occurred when 
Russia and Norway could not agree on where and how to draw these borders, which 
would separate their economic zones and continental shelves (Hønneland and Jensen 
2008: 10).  Norway claimed the border should be drawn based on the equidistance 
principle, while the Soviet Union advocated the use of the sector principle. The 
negotiations have still not reached an end, and the result is a disputed area located 
between the equidistance line and the sector line. The continental shelf in the disputed 
area is likely to contain large measures of petroleum resources (Åtland 2003: 27). 
 
The fish resources of the Barents Sea represents an important part of both Russia’s and 
Norway’s economic interests. To ensure that the existence of the disputed area did not 
lead to disagreements concerning fishing and the fish stock, the countries reached a 
compromise concerning fishing in the disputed area. Russia and Norway made a 
bilateral agreement in 1979, called the Grey Zone Agreement, which gives fishing 
vessels from both countries access to the area. The Grey Zone includes an area of 
67,500 square kilometres, whereof 41,500 square kilometres lie in the disputed area. 
Thereby the Grey Zone encompasses both the disputed part of the Barents Sea, but 
also areas that are undisputedly Russian and Norwegian. This agreement has been 
renewed several times since 1979 and the borders have still not been finally settled 
(Young 1994: 59, Elfernik 2001: 186, Åtland 2003: 28). Though the disagreement has 
not yet been resolved, the compromise shows willingness for cooperation between the 
two countries. It also shows that compromise and cooperation was possible at a time 
where peaceful, political interaction between the West and the East was sees as nearly 
impossible. An interesting fact is that 23,000 square kilometres of the Grey Zone are 
located on the undisputed side of the Norwegian economic zone, whereas only 3000 
square kilometres are located on the Russian undisputed side (Åtland 2003: 28). This 
illustrates the asymmetrical relationship between Russia and Norway, and illustrates 
how Norway often finds itself in a position where it has to give in to Russia’s demands 
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in order to reach an agreement. The Grey Zone agreement may therefore be seen as 
beneficial to Russia, as it protects Russian economic rights to a greater extent than it 
does Norwegian. Russia thus prefers the delimitation issue to remain unsolved, as 
opposed to entering into new negotiations and possibly having to modify its demands 
(Blakkisrud 2008: 8). Therefore, Russia’s willingness for cooperation and compromise 
must be seen with connection to the fact that Russia is the strongest party and not 
necessarily the one gaining the most by cooperation. As this thesis will show, a 
cooperation based on terms that are dictated by power, will be beneficial to Russia. 
However, cooperation based on institutional rules and laws will most likely be 
advantageous to Norway.  
 
In 1987 Mikhail Gorbachev gave his famous Murmansk speech, advocating 
cooperation and stability in the northern areas of Russia and the Nordic countries. Five 
years later, in 1992, the Norwegian foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg proposed 
the establishment of a Barents Region. This idea was primarily inspired by the Baltic 
Sea Council that had been created earlier in 1992, a few months prior to the Barents 
Region. The Baltic Sea Council was aimed at promoting cooperation between the 
people of the region (Kjølberg 2009a). The foreign minister of Russia, Andrej 
Kozyrev, also supported the proposal, and consequently Stoltenberg’s initiative 
resulted in the establishment of the Euro-Arctic Barents Region in 1993. The purpose 
of establishing the Barents Region was to secure stability in the northern regions 
(Hønneland and Jensen 2008: 11).  
 
The agreement is based on three principles. First of all, the Barents Region is meant to 
have a normalizing effect on the region. It is supposed to wipe out the old differences 
between the West and the East, and make Russia a “normal” neighbouring country for 
the Nordic nations. Secondly, the Barents cooperation is meant to stabilize the region. 
This was to be achieved by lowering the military tension level that had dominated the 
northern regions during the Cold War. The last of the tree principles is the one of 
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regionalization. The northern regions wanted a stronger feeling of identity and more 
regional power of influence towards the central governments and the EU as a whole. 
These three principles were to be fulfilled through regional cooperation concerning the 
fields of economy, trade, science, technology, tourism, education, culture and the 
building of infrastructure (Hønneland and Jensen 2008: 11-13). The Barents agreement 
does not, however, say anything about cooperation in the security field, even though 
Russia initially wanted it to be included (Kjølberg 2009b). Just like the Grey Zone 
Agreement, the Barents Region still exists today. The seven members of the Barents 
Council
1, which is the Barents Region’s highest organ, still meet annually to discuss 
how to develop further cooperation. In addition there are nine observing countries 
involved, among others the United States (Hønneland and Jensen 2008: 11-13.). 
 
The examples of the disputed area, the Grey Zone Agreement and the Barents Region 
have been presented in order to show that cooperation between Norway and Russia in 
the north has a long history. The Grey Zone Agreement was reached during the Soviet 
Union era, and has managed to endure through a turbulent Cold War period and 
through the fall of the Soviet. This study, however, aims to explore the prospects for 
cooperation between Norway and Russia within the increasingly important field of oil 
and gas, in relation to security policy.  
 
The two non-OPEC countries, Norway and Russia, are two of the world’s leading 
countries concerning the production and export of petroleum resources. During the 
communist regime, the petroleum production of the Soviet Union was mostly 
consumed domestically. However, since 1992, Russia has increasingly been exporting 
its petroleum outside the borders of the former Soviet Union. In the long term, Russia 
is among the most promising non-OPEC areas for making new petroleum discoveries 
(Claes 2001: 283).  
                                                 
1 The seven members are Norway, Finland, Iceland, Sweden, Denmark, Russia and the EU 
Commission (Hønneland and Jensen 2008: 12). 
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During the last few decades political issues regarding energy consumption and 
production have been increasingly stressed in the field of foreign policy. This is the 
case both for energy exporting and energy importing countries. This is due to the fact 
that the overall demand for energy worldwide has grown. At the same time there have 
been very few findings of new petroleum sources. The Barents Sea, however, has 
proven to possess great potential when it comes to developing more petroleum. As a 
result, there are a lot of expectations connected to the High North as a new and 
prosperous area for petroleum extraction. This is due not only to the fact that great 
amounts of oil and gas that are expected to be found there, but also because energy 
deliveries from the High North might become a good alternative to deliveries from the 
volatile and politically unstable Middle East (Rottem et al. 2008: 12). 
 
The situation in the High North today is not as tense as it was during the Cold War and 
the area has gained a different political and security profile in the post Cold War years. 
Today, the High North has the status of a geopolitically important area (Rowe 2009: 
1). ”Geopolitics” is a term used to describe the effect that geographical factors have on 
politics, or if you will, the interplay between geography, interests and power. 
Geopolitics has also evolved around the relationship between sea and land where the 
best and quickest way to get from one place to another used to be by sea. It was 
therefore important to have access to the ocean and be able to travel safely. Therefore, 
whoever controlled the ocean routes also possessed political power (Lodgaard 2005: 
31).  
 
Today’s technology has come a lot further, much due to energy that has provided us 
with everything from heath and electricity, to enabling us to travel quicker and has 
given us more effective weapons and vehicles to use in warfare. This has led to a 
situation where much of the power lies with those who control the sources of energy. 
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With the scarcity of petroleum getting bigger, countries seek to find ways of gaining 
access to oil and gas, either through import or production. Energy supply and energy 
security dominate the geopolitics of our time. As the High North has petroleum and 
the potential of providing the world with new energy sources, the area has gained 
status as geopolitically important (Lodgaard 2005: 31-32).  In addition to the 
petroleum resources, the High North’s geopolitical importance further increases with 
the areas unresolved sovereignty issues (Johnsen 2006: 9).  
 
The field of energy policy is a complex one, bringing implications to other policy 
issues. Energy policy is an important area of ”high politics”, as it encompasses issues 
of economic growth and national security (Keohane 1978: 932). Petroleum is 
connected to the concept of security through the fact that there is a growing demand 
for energy supply and for new sources of energy. The increase in this demand 
escalated after the Second World War. This growth has led to an increase in the price 
level of petroleum and has made petroleum resources an attractive and vital asset to its 
owners (Claes 2001: 56-57). Due to the high demand for petroleum, the countries 
possessing such resources build their economy, and thereby their survival, on 
exporting the much needed good. Moreover, having large amounts of power increases 
the security of a country. This power may be physical, such as being in the possession 
of oil and gas reserves, or it may be financial, technological or political. A state’s 
petroleum resources thereby become a part of the country’s survival. Survival is 
ultimately the main goal of any sovereign state (Claes 2001: 99-100). Kenneth Waltz 
points out that cooperation between states is not favourable, due to the danger of 
closeness. He writes that the more linked two countries are in their affairs, the larger is 
the chance of conflict (Waltz 1970: 152). Thereby, according to neorealist view, 
petroleum cooperation between Russia and Norway may easily result in conflicts. 
Adding the variable of a scarce good as petroleum into cooperation, the risks of 
cooperation might increase.   
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Moreover, petroleum can easily be used as a political tool, to either punish or reward 
others, both with regard to price and amount. An example of how Russia has used gas 
to punish countries is evident in the case of Ukraine. Though Russia has operated with 
market prices when exporting to many European countries, the gas prices demanded 
from Ukraine have always been politically motivated. In 2005 Russia suggested 
tripling the gas prices, before shutting off the Ukraine gas supplies on January 1
st
, 
2006, as a way of punishing the Ukrainian President Victor Yuschenko for his pro-
Western orientation (Helm 2007:23-24).  
 
1.2 Research Question 
The research question for this thesis is:  
How can potential oil and gas cooperation between Norway and Russia affect the 
countries’ room of manoeuvre in the field of security politics in the High North? 
 
Before being able to examine this research question, it is necessary to operationalize 
certain concepts. When performing research, it may be difficult to connect a 
theoretical concept with the phenomena one wishes to study. In order to have a clear 
idea of how to measure and examine theoretical concepts empirically, it is necessary to 
give the theoretical terms operational definitions. Operational definitions make the 
research more accurate by narrowing or broadening a given theoretical concept to fit 
the research (Hellevik 2002: 50-51).  
 
1.3 Operationalization of the Concepts 
The central concepts in need of a thorough definition relevant to the research presented 
here are  “room of manoeuvre in the field of security policy” and “the High North”. It 
is also necessary to specify who and what represents Russia and Norway in this study. 
The definition given for “room of manoeuvre” will in the first place be a general one. 
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Later in the thesis we will return to what this concept means for the two countries in 
particular. 
 
1.3.1 “Room of Manoeuvre” 
The political room of manoeuvre a country has regarding security policy, or foreign 
policy issues, depends on two factors. These factors are the costs and the benefits of a 
given country’s available political actions. The more alternative actions involve high 
benefits and small costs, the wider the room of manoeuvre and vice versa. It is 
important to remember that these costs and benefits must be seen in connection to the 
countries’ internal political systems and their public opinions. Also, the room of 
manoeuvre must be seen in connection to other countries and actors on the 
international political arena. A way for a country to increase its room of manoeuvre is 
to make its political ambitions more attractive to other countries. By having similar 
political goals as other states, one may gather support for one’s agenda and thereby 
increase the political room of manoeuvre. Furthermore, the room of manoeuvre can be 
affected by the dependency relationship between countries. Additionally, a country’s 
resources can shape its room of manoeuvre, these resources being either material or 
ideological. A country’s room of manoeuvre is a variable, hence under constant 
change. In other words, the term “room of manoeuvre” is a relative one. This means 
that a country’s political room of manoeuvre varies in relation to time, policy area and 
even geographical area (Knutsen et al. 2000: 38-39).  
 
1.3.2 The High North 
When trying to define the High North, one cannot avoid running into ambiguities 
concerning what exactly separates the label of the High North from the labels of the 
Far North, the Eurasian Arctic, the Barents Region or the North Calotte, to mention a 
few. Defining the High North from a Norwegian point of view also causes some 
conceptual problems, as Norway’s definition differs from that of the EU. Moreover 
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internally in Norway there has also been disagreement on the issue, which has led to 
changes in the definition over time. In the early 1990’s it was common to use the term 
“ the Barents Region” about what is today known as ”the High North”. ”The Barents 
Region” was used as a political rather than geographical term, reflecting the regional 
cooperation between the northern parts of the Nordic countries and the northern parts 
of Russia. During the mid 1990’s, ”the Northern Areas” largely replaced the term “the 
Barents Region”. ”The Northern Areas” is a term that is still used in Norway when 
discussing the Norwegian northern politics and it tends to include the northern parts of 
Norway and the nearby land and sea areas. In 2003, however, Norway defined the 
Northern Areas as the entire circumpolar Arctic. This was in order to bring about a 
more internationalist view of the Northern Areas. Two years later, the second 
Bondevik government introduced the concept of the High North. When translating 
official Norwegian documents into English, the Norwegian term ”nordområdene” is 
now translated into ”the High North” (Sawhill 2008). 
 
As “the High North” has become the appropriate term to use when talking about 
Norwegian politics up north, this will be the term used in this research project. 
However, the definition of the High North will not encompass the entire circumpolar 
Arctic. For the sake of this thesis, the High North will refer to a far smaller 
geographical area. Here, the term “High North” will be used as a reference to the 
northern parts of Norway and the Norwegian Sea, stretching across the Russian border 
to include the Russian part of the Barents Sea. More specifically, these are the parts 
where a potential oil and gas cooperation between the two countries may be likely to 
occur in the future. In order to narrow down the research, the definition of the High 
North will be limited to the area where one may expect Norwegian-Russian petroleum 
cooperation to take place, thereby leaving out the rest of the Arctic. The map below 
may give a clearer idea of the area in question.  
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Figure 1.1 Map Illustrating the Northern Part of Europe
2
  
 
1.3.3 Russia and Norway 
Since the 1970s the world has experienced an increased politization of petroleum. The 
private petroleum firms have been outnumbered by states wanting to be in control over 
their own natural resources. Owning the petroleum companies gave the countries an 
opportunity to collect larger profits (Claes 2001: 2, Noreng 2007: 100). Consequently 
the interaction between petroleum producers has become synonymous to interaction 
                                                 
2
 Reference: http://33-minutes.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/08/barents_sea_map.jpg  
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between states. This is not to say, though, that the petroleum producing states always 
act unitary when it comes to energy policy (Claes 2001: 2). 
 
The company of Gazprom is partially owned by the Russian government and partially 
privatized. Gazprom has often been called “a state within the state” and has close, even 
direct, links to the Russian government and the Russian President (Stern 2005: 172-
173). As a part of Putin’s desire to strengthen the state and provide the state with the 
leading role in the management of important sectors such as the energy sector, private 
oil companies were dismantled. Two large state owned companies remain central in 
the energy business, namely Rosneft and Gazprom (Moe 2009: 108-109). Gazprom is 
the largest company in the world and controls 90 per cent of Russian gas. Smaller 
companies are, in reality, not actual competitors on the market, as they need 
permission from Gazprom to enter Gazprom’s gas pipes. The Russian gas sector is 
connected to the central political power in such matter that Gazprom may be said to 
work as a Ministry of Gas (Larsson 2006:  30). The political centralization and the 
strengthening of the state has led Moscow to become the main advocate for both 
energy and security interests (Baev, not dated).  
 
Resource nationalism is evident in Norway as well. The Norwegian government has 
also taken control over the state’s petroleum resources (Helm 2007: 8). The largest oil 
and gas company in Norway, Statoil, was partially privatized in 2001. Today, in 2009, 
the Norwegian state owns 67 per cent of the company, whereas the rest belongs to 
various stockholders (Statoil 2009).  
 
As both the Russian and the Norwegian state operate as representatives of their 
countries’ petroleum companies and petroleum interests, this thesis will employ the 
terms “Russia” and “Norway”.   
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1.4 Outline of the Thesis 
In order to answer the stated research question, this thesis will proceed on the 
following path. First, chapter 2 will lie out the methodological approach that will be 
used to answer the research question. This will be executed in order to give the reader 
an understanding of how the research has been conducted and how the conclusions 
presented in this study have been reached. The third chapter will specify the theoretical 
assumptions this thesis builds on. Similar to the chapter on methodology, the one on 
theory will also give a better understanding of how the research question is to be 
answered. Chapter four will give the reader the broad empirical background needed to 
gain a larger understanding of the field of research, before proceeding to chapter five 
and six for a detailed discussion of respectively the Russian and the Norwegian High 
North policy and room of manoeuvre. The seventh chapter will present an analysis of 
petroleum cooperation and room of manoeuvre of the two countries, based on the 
theoretical assumptions of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. More 
specifically it will use the two aforementioned theories to say something about how 
Russia and Norway’s room of manoeuvre in the field of security policy can be affected 
by petroleum cooperation. Finally, the thesis will end with a conclusion based on its 
findings.  
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2 Method 
This thesis will use the case study approach to analyze the relationship between 
Norway and Russia regarding security policy and oil- and gas cooperation in order to 
give a satisfactory answer to the research question. 
 
When deciding which scientific approach to use for a given research topic, one should 
first examine the research question. By doing so, the research question may provide an 
important clue regarding what kind of method one should use. A research question 
should consist of both substance and form (Yin 2003: 7). The reason for choosing a 
case study approach in this thesis is that the goal here is to answer a “how “ question.  
 
This research will be undertaken by using a theoretically explanatory case method. 
This type of case method is appropriate to use when the researcher seeks to view a 
phenomenon through the lenses of established theories. The most famous example of a 
theoretically explanatory case study is Graham Allison’s study of the Cuban Missile 
crisis. In this study, Allison explains the American president’s reaction to the crisis in 
three different ways, using three different theoretical approaches (Allison 1969). The 
purpose of the study was to show how a situation might be viewed in several different 
ways, depending on which theory is being used (Andersen 1997: 68-69). In the case of 
Russia and Norway, this thesis will use two highly established and acknowledged 
theories within the fields of political science and international relations. The theories 
in question are neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism. The two theories will be 
explained in chapter 3. 
 
When doing a theoretically explanatory case study, it is important to maintain a clear 
connection between the theory that has been chosen and the empirical phenomena that 
are to be examined. Problems may occur if theory and reality are too loosely 
14 
 
connected. In such cases the main theoretical assumptions and concepts may be 
inappropriate in relation to the phenomena one is studying (Andersen 1997: 68-70). 
The chapter reviewing the theoretical base for the research will clarify why the two 
theories chosen are relevant for this study. 
 
2.1 Data 
This theoretically interpretive case study will be based on empirical observations. 
These will not be direct empirical observations made by the researcher, but rather base 
itself on previous research. The idea is to make conclusions based on previous 
findings, thereby conducting cumulative research (Hellevik 2002: 17).  
 
The data used is mostly taken from secondary sources such as essays, articles and 
reports from acknowledged research institutes such as the Norwegian Atlantic 
Committee, the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, the Norwegian Defense Research 
Establishment (FFI) and Ocean Futures. The study has also used the information 
provided by European research centres. Additional data has been collected from 
various newspaper articles.  
 
Concerning the data collection, a challenge has been to find reliable sources containing 
information on Russia’s security policies, and on Russia’s security policy towards 
Norway. This can to a certain extent be explained by the researcher’s lack of sufficient 
knowledge of the Russian language. It may also be caused by, either the fact that such 
a policy area contains sensitive information that is confidential, or the fact that studies 
on relations between the two countries regarding this field of research is not a priority 
to Russia. However, some sources have been found, and the researcher has made an 
effort to draw relevant conclusions based on this material. 
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Supplementing the material from previous research that has been used here with other 
sources of data, such as data collected by direct observations of interviews with 
political actors, could strengthen the validity and reliability of the conclusions reached. 
Due to time limitations this was not possible to do, but the author has had helpful 
conversations and discussions with Norwegian experts on energy and security policy.   
 
2.2 Validity 
There are three different categories of validity one has to pay attention to when doing a 
case study. These three are constructed validity, internal validity and external validity 
(Yin 2003: 34). In order to connect these concepts of validity to the thesis, it is useful 
to first define their meaning. This will be done briefly before proceeding on to 
discussing validity in respect to this particular research. 
 
Constructed validity is directly connected to the concepts being studied. In other 
words, the researcher must establish the correct operational measures for the subjects 
in question (Yin 2003: 34). In order to have a strong constructed validity, one must 
operationalize central concepts to the research question. This is carried out in order to 
give a clear idea of what is meant by the subject of study. With regard to the research 
question of this thesis there are four concepts in need of definition, “room of 
manoeuvre”,  “High North”, and who and what constitutes the Russian and Norwegian 
state.  
 
Internal validity is a concept used only in relation to explanatory or causal studies. In 
order to maintain a strong internal validity, it is necessary to establish a causal 
relationship between the variables being studied. One needs to be clear about how 
certain conditions may lead to specific outcomes. The danger of attempting to 
establish a causal relationship between two variables is that one may overlook the 
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influence of a third variable. Thereby one may wrongly conclude the existence of a 
relationship where x causes y, without considering the spurious relationship that a 
given factor z has on y. If one makes conclusions that overlook spurious influence, the 
internal validity of the research becomes weakened (Yin 2003: 34-35).  
 
The research question of this thesis implies that a relationship may be established 
between manoeuvre room in security policy and petroleum cooperation. Is there reason 
to believe that such a causal relationship may exist? To answer this question it is 
necessary to further explore the employed variables further. This thesis operates with 
two variables, namely room of manoeuvre in the field of security policy, and 
petroleum cooperation. In this case, the former is the dependent variable, whereas the 
latter is the independent variable. The research question assumes, as mentioned earlier, 
that there exists a relationship between the room of manoeuvre and petroleum 
cooperation. When making this assumption, it is important to specify the reasons for 
claiming the existence of such a relationship. This will be carried out later on in this 
thesis. 
 
The last of the three types of validity is external validity. External validity relates to 
the ability of generalizing the research results beyond the specific case being studied. 
Usually, case studies are often criticized for having weak external validity (Yin 2003: 
37). Theoretically interpretive case studies, such as this one is, are somewhat more 
fitted for generalization than other types of case studies. When doing theoretically 
interpretive studies, the researcher uses general theories to analyze or explain a 
specific case. The researcher’s observations of the case will be systematically 
connected to an established theory, thereby making it possible to draw general 
conclusions (Andersen 2005: 97). 
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This is a case study of the bilateral relationship between two neighbouring countries; 
Russia and Norway. Generalizations may be possible, as this study can be 
representative of cooperative relations between other neighbouring countries. 
However, it is hard to argue that the conclusions drawn here might be relevant when it 
comes to cooperation and security policies between other countries. It is important to 
keep in mind that Russia and Norway represents a seemingly unique case. This is 
because they share a common border, a strained past and they are two of the world’s 
leading energy producers and exporters. Given Russia and Norway’s characteristic 
relationship and qualities, a case study of their cooperative relationship in the energy 
sector and their room of manoeuvre in the field of foreign policy may be in danger of 
having a low external validity. 
 
2.3 Reliability 
Reliability deals with the accuracy of the study’s conclusions. This includes the use of 
references relevant for the research and the lack of errors or bias in the study. In order 
to increase the reliability of one’s research, it is important to illustrate and document 
how the conclusions came to be drawn. When testing the reliability of a research 
product, a fellow researcher should be able to reach the same conclusions by using the 
same sources and approach used in the initial study. Case studies have often been 
criticized for having low reliability, as the steps taken in the study often seem to be 
poorly documented (Hellevik 2002: 471, Yin 2003: 37-38). 
 
This thesis will give accurate references throughout the text and also include a 
bibliography at the end. This will make it easy to look up the sources of the arguments, 
thereby ensuring high reliability.  
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3 Theoretical Framework 
In order to find out how oil and gas cooperation in the High North might affect the 
room of manoeuvre for Norway and Russia regarding security policy, this thesis will 
use the methodological approach of theoretically explanatory cases. In such cases the 
analysis depends greatly on the theoretical ground it is based on. Due to the 
differences between Norway and Russia when it comes to traditional foreign policy 
approaches, domestic policy, historical background and size of the countries, it is 
challenging to analyze the two on the basis of one theory alone. Therefore this thesis 
will use two theories, namely neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism to analyze the 
two. Using two theories will allow differences between the two countries to be visible, 
thereby making the conclusions more nuanced.    
 
3.1 Applying Theory 
Within the field of International Relations, the theoretical approaches can be roughly 
divided into two categories, positivist and constructivist. The theories building on 
positivism lead to research based on material factors, whereas constructivist research 
values ideational factors (Wight 2002: 39). Robert Cox made the distinction between 
problem solving theory on one side and critical theory on the other. The problem 
solving theories are connected to positivism, aiming to take the world as it is and seek 
to explain it better. This in turn leads research based on problem solving theories to 
ask how- and why questions. Critical theory, on the other hand, focuses on research 
aimed at normative questions, asking how situations and conditions may be improved 
(Cox 1986: 128-129).  
 
The research question of this thesis is aimed at examining how oil and gas cooperation 
can affect the room of manoeuvre in the field of security. It is evident when looking at 
the research question and topic that this thesis does not aim to answer normative 
questions. It seeks however to explore the relationship between Russia and Norway 
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and illuminate a specific part of that relationship, concerning petroleum cooperation 
and security policy. This thesis will, in other words, rely on positivism in order to 
conduct its analysis. 
 
Besides asking ”how” and ”why” questions, positivism builds on empiricist 
epistemology. This means that science should be derived from observable evidence 
from the material world around us. By using such observable evidence, we can 
develop theoretical assumptions, explanations and predictions (Miller 1972: 798). The 
two theories that are to be presented both belong to problem solving theories, and they 
seek to derive their evidence based on observations of the world known to us. 
 
3.2 Neorealism 
The theoretical school of realism makes a distinction between classical realism, 
formulated by Hans Morgenthau, and neorealism, developed by Kenneth Waltz. 
Among the characteristics separating the two branches of realism is how the two 
explain the origins of conflicts in international affairs. Both consider states to be power 
pursuing, and suppose them to be the main actors on the international stage. However, 
they disagree with regard to what motivates the states’ quest for power and why 
conflicts among states occur. Whereas Morgenthau’s classical realism operates with 
the assumption that international conflicts arise because of the imperfect human 
nature, neorealism sees international conflicts as a consequence of the anarchic 
international system that states interact with each other in (Pashakhanlou 2009). This 
thesis will build on neorealism, as this has been the dominant theoretical approach 
within the study of international relations the last decades.  
 
The main characteristic of neorealism is that sovereign states coexist in an anarchic 
world. Anarchy exists due to the lack of a hierarchic structure at the international level 
as opposed to inside each of the sovereign countries. This in turn, leads to the lack of a 
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legitimate world government. Hence, countries interact with each other in an anarchic 
international system. The international anarchy is made out of several similar units. 
These units are states. Sovereignty is the common trait all states possess, but other than 
this they differ greatly from each other. The differences among them lie in the fact that 
they vary in amongst other things, factors such as size, power and wealth. As a result 
of the international anarchy the states find themselves in a “self – help system”. Each 
state seeks to act in whichever way it thinks will best serve its own interests. The self-
interests may be pursued with or without the use of force. However the states are 
aware that force may at any time be used against them by more powerful states. As 
there is no world government to appeal to should such force occur, the states know that 
they are left to fend for themselves and thereby wish to avoid possible war or military 
attacks. The constant possibility of military force gives the states an incentive not to 
provoke each other (Waltz 1979: 103-116). 
 
The most important of the neorealist assumptions is, as mentioned, that sovereign 
states coexist in an anarchic international system, forcing them to act in whichever 
way is best suitable to sustain their own sovereignty and other self – interests. As there 
is a lack of an international government that is superior to the state, the states are seen 
as being the most important actors on the international arena. These assumptions are 
all important to keep in mind when analyzing the relationship between Russia and 
Norway. However, when using parsimonious theories it is easy to get lost in their wide 
assumptions and fail to connect the theory with the actual phenomena that are being 
studied. In this lies also a methodological challenge, which has previously been 
mentioned in the paragraph concerning the method. When doing theoretically 
explanatory case studies it is crucial to keep a clear connection between theoretical 
concepts and the phenomena being studied. In order to do so it is useful to go beyond 
the general assumptions of neorealism and narrow the theory to better fit the research 
question.  
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Neorealism has a rather sceptical view on cooperation among states. According to 
neorealism, the structure of the international system limits international cooperation, 
because of the system’s anarchic nature. As the states are struggling for survival in a 
self – help system, cooperation is difficult because of the question of gain. If 
cooperation was to occur, which of the countries would gain the most from it? The fear 
of which state will gain the most out of cooperation will keep the countries from 
cooperating. This is because each state will fear that the other will gain more and that 
it will be inclined to use its increased gain to attack other states. In other words, states 
worry that a division of possible gain will favour other states more than themselves. 
Furthermore countries also worry that cooperation might make them dependent on 
others. This may happen by, for example, increased international trade. The more a 
state depends on exports and imports in order to survive, the more vulnerable it will 
appear to other states. In a self – help system dependence on other countries is, 
according to neorealism, viewed as a weakness. Although neorealism does 
acknowledge that cooperation might increase a state’s economic gain, it does not find 
cooperation advantageous. Even though it might lead to an increase in economic 
prosperity, it will also lead to a decrease of state security. Neorealism sees strong 
security and defence as superior to economic gain. In the anarchic self – help system 
states will therefore make security issues a priority over economy. This is in order to 
be able to maintain their sovereignty  (Waltz 1979: 105-107).   
 
The end of the Cold War brought a wave of criticism towards neorealism, as it had 
failed to predict the fall of communism and the end of the bipolar, international system 
(Mastanduno 1997: 49). Viewing today’s relations between Russia and Norway 
through neorealist assumptions will help give an understanding of whether or not 
realism still has explanatory power in the field of international relations.  
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3.3 Neoliberal Institutionalism 
Like neorealism, neoliberal institutionalism also builds on the assumption of sovereign 
states coexisting in an anarchic international system, defined by the lack of a common 
government. Neoliberal institutionalism, however, does not see the international 
anarchy as an obstacle when it comes to cooperation among states. Although the 
theory assumes that the international system is anarchic, it does not see it as 
completely lacking a form of organization. Where neorealists see the relationship 
between the states as dominated by the struggle for power and the fear of being 
attacked, the neoliberal institutionalists see it as much more stable. They argue that by 
continuous interaction over a long period of time; the countries build up certain 
perceptions about each other. These perceptions enable the countries to have stable 
expectations about each other. The expectations they have, in turn, enable them to 
cooperate with each other (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 226-227). Whereas neorealists 
see cooperation as a potential source of power struggle, neoliberal institutionalists see 
it quite differently. They view cooperation as a way of making parties or states who 
are not connected to each other in pre-existent harmony, come to agreement in 
conformity. By entering a state of cooperation the parties change their behaviour in 
accordance to each other by a mutual coordination of policy (Keohane 1988: 380).   
 
An important factor in the theory of neoliberal institutionalism is international 
institutions. According to the theory, institutions are necessary in order to facilitate 
cooperation. International institutions lower the costs of cooperation by providing 
information to the parties involved. This is information that would otherwise be likely 
being kept hidden in fear of exploitation. When however the information is open to the 
parties involved, the transparency of the negotiations is greater and the need for 
cheating is lowered (Keohane 1982: 346). By providing information, international 
institutions are able to remove some of the uncertainty and some of the costs of 
cooperating in an anarchic world. The reliability of the action of other parties, which is 
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provided by the access to information, removes the shadow of the future, making 
cooperation possible (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 233-234).      
 
Seeing as neoliberal institutionalism acknowledges both the presence of international 
anarchy and the possibility of cooperation, it argues that should cooperation occur, it 
must do so in consistence with sovereignty and the self – help system. In order to 
achieve that, cooperation must happen by the principle of reciprocity (Keohane 1986: 
1). Shortly explained reciprocity means that the parties involved exchange good for 
good and bad for bad. The good for good and bad for bad principle refers to the 
exchange of both values and actions. Cooperation in accordance with reciprocity can 
be compared to the game theoretical approach of ”tit for tat”. In a ”tit for tat” game the 
first player cooperates on his first move of the sequence. Then on a subsequent move it 
does what the other player did prior to him. In this way good deeds are repaid by good 
deeds and bad are repaid by bad. However one must be aware that domination and 
exploitation may be hidden in relationships of reciprocity. Even if this is not the case 
and the cooperation is truly based on reciprocity the actors may face different 
opportunity costs. This is due to the fact that a relationship of cooperation never is 
completely equal. There will always be strong parties and weak parties in any given 
relationship of cooperation (Keohane 1986: 8).  
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4 Empirical Background 
The area defined in this thesis as the High North has the potential to become a new and 
promising oil and gas region. Though large areas of the High North remain 
unexplored, there are reasons to believe that it contains vast petroleum resources. 
Petroleum resources are defined as the whole amount of oil- and gas a region might 
possess, based on geological assessments of the resource potential. This includes both 
the petroleum that is discovered and the petroleum that is yet to be discovered by 
further exploration. Petroleum reserves, on the other hand, are the known amount of 
oil – and gas that an area holds (Ocean Futures 2007). 
 
4.1 Oil and Gas Cooperation 
In 2001 Norway experienced that the North Sea oil production reached its peak. In 
order to maintain the position as an oil-producing nation, the country had to look 
elsewhere for new petroleum sources (Ocean Futures 2007). Consequently Norway 
turned to the High North. The Barents Sea, located in the High North, is the least 
explored part of Norway’s continental shelf. There are, however, great expectations for 
the Barents Sea to become a new province of growing petroleum production. Two 
petroleum fields are developed in the area, the gas field Snøhvit and the oil field 
Goliath. Snøhvit is today the only petroleum field in the Barents Sea that is under 
actual production. The gas from Snøhvit is transported to land through gas pipes, 
leading to Melkeøya outside of Hammerfest. Here, the gas is processed and 
transformed into liquid natural gas (LNG) (Rottem et al. 2008 et al.: 69-73). According 
to estimates made by the Norwegian Ministry of Oil and Energy, two thirds of 
Norway’s undiscovered petroleum resources are expected to be located in the Barents 
Sea (Utenriksdepartementet 2006: 11).  
 
The largest petroleum resources in the High North have been found on the Russian 
side of the Barents Sea. The amount of petroleum reserves on the Russian side of the 
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border exceeds by far those of Norway. This makes Russia a superpower regarding 
energy resources. Russia is already the world’s largest producer of petroleum. 
Including the reserves in the Barents Sea, Russia’s position as a powerful energy state 
can only be strengthened further. However, there is currently no production taking 
place on the Russian shelf of the Barents Sea (Rottem et al. 2008: 71-73). The world’s 
largest known gas field, the Shtokman field, was discovered in 1988. This field is 
located on the Russian side of the Barents Sea, 600 km north east of Murmansk 
(Gazprom).  
 
With the reserves in the High North, Russia seeks to further strengthen its position as a 
powerful energy exporter. The terrorist attacks of 9/11 enabled Russia to position itself 
as more reliable energy supplier to the West, compared to the Middle East. In the 
aftermath of the attack both the political sector and the corporate energy sector in 
Russia started portraying the country as an alternative, and a more stable energy 
exporter than the Middle East. Russia advocated that their oil companies could be 
trusted to act as stable sources of energy supply. Furthermore, Russia also argued that 
their companies would act according to the market, keeping the prices reasonable and 
thus reviving the global economy. The resources in the High North can, in other 
words, make Russia an even more powerful energy state, overshadowing the Middle 
East. Should Russia continue to grow to become an energy superpower, the OPEC 
countries will be the financial losers. Most of the OPEC members are energy 
producing countries with state monopoly companies, which are not open to foreign 
investment. Energy producing countries and international companies outside the 
OPEC will not be as threatened by Russia’s increasing energy production (Morse and 
Richard 2002: 16-17). Currently, the High North is seen as a more reliable source for 
hydrocarbon, compared to the Middle East. Therefore, both Russian and Norwegian 
energy has to a certain extent benefited in a world where terrorism and political 
instability threaten energy supplies from traditional sources, represented by regions 
such as the Middle East. 
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On the other hand, Russia is in some ways also seen as an unreliable source of energy. 
Russian reliability as an energy provider is credible considering that most of Russian 
petroleum exports have reached it final destination. However, there is a risk that the 
flow of energy might be interrupted due to political and/or economic disagreements 
between Russia and a given European country (Larsson 2006: 3), or a transit country 
such as Ukraine. The Russians energy sector seems to be more politicized than 
commercial, as the Russians have shown themselves capable of using energy as a 
political tool. This was recently the case when Russia cut gas delivery to Ukraine 
(Godzimirski 2009: 3-4). In turn, this gas conflict also affected several West European 
countries, which also lost parts of their gas supplies. Incidents such as this, may give 
Norway an advantage concerning energy export. Russia and Norway will continue to 
compete in the European and global energy market. Should the scepticism towards 
Russia’s reliability rise, and the customers get the choice between Russia and Norway, 
they might prefer Norwegian petroleum over Russian, as Russia tends to use it as a 
political tool rather than merely a commercial good (Nore 2007: 43-48).  Moreover, 
Russia suffers from internal instabilities that contribute to making the country an 
unreliable source of energy. The market economy of Russia is highly dependent of the 
state in order to function. The Russian market liberalism lacks established institutional 
framework that guarantees personal safety, property rights, stable business contracts, 
and a functioning and predictable bureaucracy (Tranøy and Østerud 2001: 13-14, 
Utenriksdepartementet 2006: 15).  
 
Oil and gas cooperation between Norway and Russia is first and foremost planned to 
be taking place on the Russian side of the Barents Sea. This is where the potential for 
cooperation is greatest, because of the technological challenges associated with the 
development of deep water oil and gas fields in the Arctic waters. Although the 
Russians have made significant gas discoveries in the area situated on their side of the 
border, there has not yet been any production, as Russia lacks the technological 
offshore expertise necessary to engage in such a project. However, the Russians are 
eager to start developing the Shtokman field. Therefore, Russia needs technological 
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assistance from foreign companies (Ocean Futures 2007). The intended cooperation 
between the two countries has created great expectations in the northern parts of 
Norway. Areas such as Finmark and Troms might benefit from such cooperation, as it 
is likely to bring economic growth to the region. Though the Norwegian technology is 
needed in Russia, it is optimistic to assume that Norway will be given considerable 
access to Russian petroleum development. Russia will, to the extend possible, seek to 
use its own industry and knowledge (Nore 2007: 50-51). 
 
Furthermore, Norway has also strong incentives for engaging in cooperation with 
Russia. As previously mentioned, the Norwegian North Sea oil production has reached 
its peak. Although some new gas fields are in production in the Norwegian Barents 
Sea, the petroleum industry needs to find additional sources of oil and gas. As the 
Norwegian production is declining, Norwegian petroleum companies will, in order to 
survive, need to expand their area of operations and search for new customers abroad. 
Gaining access to the Russian side of the Barents Sea through cooperation with Russia 
could compensate for the declining production in Norway (Johansen and Kjølberg 
1999: 6). Participating in the development of the Shtokman field could provide 
Norwegian companies with business opportunities for many decades (Øverland 2008: 
132).  
 
The beginning of such a technological cooperation between Russia and Norway was 
formally started in 2007 when Russian Gazprom and Norwegian StatoilHydro (today 
called Statoil) signed a Memorandum of understanding. The document states that 
Gazprom and StatoilHydro will work together in geological exploration, development 
and production of hydrocarbon resources in the High North. The agreement also 
makes the two companies partners in Phase 1 of the Shtokman gas condensate field 
development (StatoilHydro 2009). 
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In addition to Gazprom and StatoilHydro, the French company Total is also 
participating as a partner in the Shtokman project. In 2007 StatoilHydro and Total each 
signed an agreement with Gazprom, concerning the main conditions of cooperation 
regarding Phase 1 of the Shtokman project. On February 21, 2008, the three parties 
also signed a shareholder agreement. The shareholder agreement established the 
Shtokman Development AG special purpose company. The three companies involved 
in the special purpose company own all the company’s stocks. Gazprom is the largest 
stockowner, having 51 per cent of the stocks. Total owns 25 per cent of the stocks and 
StaoilHydro owns 24 per cent. The Shtokman Development AG special purpose 
company gives Gazprom, Total and StatoilHydro ownership of the Shtokman Phase 1 
infrastructure for 25 years (Gazprom). 
 
It is worth mentioning that in addition to the proven and estimated amounts of 
petroleum belonging to each of the two countries, there are also estimated to be large 
reserves in the disputed area of the Barents Sea. The Russian energy ministry believes 
there to be approximately 400 million tons of oil and 5800 billion cubic meters of gas 
in the disputed area. This is, however, not known for sure, as it has not been explored 
at all. As long as Norway and Russia do not come to an agreement resolving the 
dispute, there will be no exploratory drilling taking place (Ocean Futures 2007). 
 
It is evident that a cooperative relationship between Norway and Russia is already in 
existence in the oil and gas sector. Still, the research question asks what kind of effect 
potential oil and gas cooperation can have on the two countries’ room of manoeuvre in 
security policy. The reason for stressing the word “potential” in this context is that 
although StatoilHydro has engaged in agreements with Gazprom, there is no guarantee 
that the parties will follow through on the planned projects. Either one of the parties 
may back away from the agreement, for various reasons. Russia has previously 
changed its mind about including foreign companies. In 2006, after engaging in talks 
about cooperation with both Norwegian and other foreign companies, Russia decided 
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to develop Shtokman without foreign assistance (Oil-and gas.net 2005). Larsson 
(2006) argues that Russia views energy as a way of securing national interests. Energy 
should be used to extend Russia’s economic reach and influence in order to gain more 
power security wise. Thereby energy policy gets detached from purely economic or 
commercial interests and linked to foreign and security policy. As a consequence, 
conducting energy policy becomes the same as conducting foreign policy. The 
explanation for reluctance towards engaging foreign companies can be that Russia 
does not want other actors interfering in their security policy process (Larsson 2006: 
68). 
 
Russia is not the only one reluctant to such engagements. StatoilHydro, for one, is not 
planning on investing in the Shtokman field until the conditions of the agreement and 
cooperation are set and perceived as firm and stable. It was mentioned above that the 
Russian internal political and economical structure is characterised by instability. The 
centralized government and the close ties between the political elite and the 
commercial sector makes foreign investor reluctant to engage in Russian business, as 
the political interests of the country seem to dominate and overshadow the commercial 
interests. Moreover, Russia has no tradition for regarding small states as equal 
business partners. Russia always considers itself the superior party and expects smaller 
states to comply with Russian demands. This will probably be the case for Norway as 
well, should the country choose to engage in cooperation with its large neighbour 
(Utgaard 2005: 2). Although uncertainties still remain regarding the Shtokman 
operation, StatoilHydro is showing interest for yet another large gas field 
development. On the 24
th
 of August this year, the director of StatoilHydro, Helge Lund 
attended a meeting with the board of Gazprom. This meeting was not to discuss further 
plans for Shtokman, but for StatoilHydro to express its interest of participation in the 
development of the gas fields of Yamal – Nenets, located in Northwest Siberia (E24 
2009).  
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The field of Yamal – Nenets leads to another issue regarding the prospects of 
cooperation between Norway and Russia. Shtokman is, as previously stated; the 
largest known offshore gas field in the world and it is located on the Russian side of 
the Barents Sea. In Norway there has been much anticipation regarding weather or not 
Gazprom will include StatoilHydro in the Shtokman development and there are still 
uncertainties concerning Russia’s eagerness to begin this development. Russia is in 
possession of large fields located in both Western Siberia and Eastern Siberia. Unlike 
Shtokman, these are onshore. Hence, the development of these fields involves fewer 
challenges compared to the ones of Shtokman. In addition Russia has experience when 
it comes to onshore gas projects, making them independent of foreign assistance. The 
fields in Western Siberia also have a market waiting for them, as the energy demand in 
China and other parts of Asia is growing (Austvik 2006: 9). Should Russia choose to 
prioritize the projects in Yamal, it may have negative affects on the planned Shtokman 
operation. The Shtokman field may be delayed, as it will be challenging to engage in 
two large fields at the same time (Socor 2009). 
 
4.2 The Security Situation in the High North 
Traditionally security policy has been equal to policy on military matters. In the High 
North this has been particularly related to potential West – East military 
confrontations. In recent years, however, the focus on the military dimension in the 
High North has faded. Norway no longer needs to be constantly prepared for a Russian 
invasion in the north, as the old Cold War division between the West and the East is 
irrelevant today. A Russian invasion is not seen as very likely, and the Norwegian 
military has adapted to this view by no longer prioritising a large defence in the North. 
Large parts of the Norwegian Army are instead used in international military 
operations abroad (Rottem et al. 2008: 10). Just as a Russian invasion is considered not 
likely from a Norwegian point of view, it is also not plausible for Russia to engage in 
such an operation. The end of the Cold War led to disarmament of the Russian 
military. Cuttings in the military sector dominated Russia in the 1990s, leading to a 
32 
 
quantitatively weakened military; a less advanced technology and weakened skills 
(Blakkisrud 2007, Flikke, not dated). At the turn of the millennium, former President 
Vladimir Putin started reinvesting in, and strengthening all branches of the Russian 
military. Due to the neglect of the 1990s, the Russian military is still weaker than 
during the Cold War, but relatively stronger than it was during the last decade 
(Blakkisrud 2007).  
 
Traditionally, the security policy of the High North was dominated by the fear of 
military confrontation between the West and the Soviet Union. When dealing with 
today’s security situation, we find it more complex and varied than the one during the 
Cold War. The complexity of today’s High North security status makes it difficult for 
the High North countries, such as Norway and Russia, to be prepared to face all the 
threats. Today’s security challenges in the High North include environmental hazards, 
terrorism and excessive exploitation of natural resources such as fish (Rottem et al. 
2008: 11). The environmental security problems are mostly tied to the energy 
production in, and transportation through, the area. The possibility of oil and gas 
leakage is one of the challenges Russia and Norway must face. With energy 
production on the Russian side of the Barents Sea emerging, the Murmansk area is set 
to become an international energy hub. It will be the location from where both Russian 
and international actors will export energy. This will mean increased ship traffic along 
the Norwegian coastline, which in turn creates environmental dangers (Godzimirski 
2007a: 16). The Disputed Area in the Barents Sea can also be considered a potential 
source of conflict. The area is likely to contain petroleum recourses that might be 
desirable in a world dominated by energy demands and energy scarcity. Problems can 
occur if both Russia and Norway were to claim sovereignty of the resources there. In 
order to prevent such a disagreement, the two countries have acknowledged that no 
petroleum exploration will take place in the area until the dispute is settled and the 
sovereignty rights established (Ocean Futures 2006: 2).  
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The security situation today might appear blurred compared to the one of the Cold War 
where the military aspect was central. It is important to keep in mind that the military 
aspect is still relevant, though somewhat weakened. After the end of the Cold War, 
Russia has shown that it is still both willing and capable of using military force. This 
was recently shown in August 2008, during the Russo – Georgian conflict (de Haas 
2009: 2). Furthermore, as will be elaborated on below, Russia is becoming more and 
more sceptical and suspicious towards the strong NATO presence in the High North. 
Consequently Russia sees the West more as a threat, leaning towards the classical 
“East-West” division that dominated Cold War thinking. Recently, much due to the 
energy resources of the area, the High North has yet again become an area of potential 
military confrontation (Holtsmark  2009a: 1-3). 
 
If the military situation should develop into something resembling that of the Cold 
War, the reasons for it would be different. The fall of the Soviet Union removed the 
variable of communism in the relationship between Russia and the West. New 
conflicts within the High North will therefore no longer be based on ideological 
differences, but rather on economical. Tensions may rise with connection to the energy 
race and the search for new petroleum resources (Blakkisrud 2007). However, some 
things remain as they did during the Cold War. The relationship between Russia and 
NATO is, though improved, still tense. Russia’s perception of Norway is not shaped 
by merely Russia’s impression of Norway as a neighbouring country. Norway is a far 
smaller country than Russia, and thereby no threat to its large neighbour. But Russia 
sees Norway as a part of NATO, an alliance that Russia still has a difficult relationship 
with, and therefore the Russian perceptions of Norway are often shaped by Russia’s 
perceptions of NATO (Godzimirski 2007b: 5).  
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4.3 Differences in Interests and Values 
A country’s perceptions of international politics are not necessarily shaped by the 
actual conditions at hand. Rather, countries tend to view each other based on their own 
subjective interpretations (Waltz 1979: 310). As Russia and Norway differ regarding 
their experience and position in the global world order, they are bound to interpret the 
international arena, and each other’s actions, differently from one another.  
Misunderstandings concerning security and intentions occur when actors interpret each 
other’s intentions in the wrong way. Græger (not dated) writes that increased 
Norwegian military presence in the High North is from Norway’s point of view a way 
of maintaining regional stability and preventing conflicts. It is not intended as a way of 
militarizing the area. However, she also writes that Norway interprets Russian military 
activity as a way of aggressively marking their ambitions of power. Likewise, Russia 
keeps misinterpreting actions from Norway, and the West in general. An example is 
how Russia sees the Western environmental concerns as an agenda intended to weaken 
Russia in the High North. Russia also interprets the presence of Norway and NATO in 
the High North as a way of militarizing the area (Oldberg 2008: 43-44). 
 
This mentality was evident also when Norway at the begging of the new millennium 
passed a law intended to protect the environment on Svalbard. Russia saw this law as 
move Norway took in order to limit the Russian economic activity on Svalbard, 
thereby weakening the Russian economy (Rottem et. al 2008: 63).   
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5 Russia 
This chapter will begin by giving a brief summary of Russian traditional foreign and 
security policy approach towards Norway in the High North. Secondly, the chapter 
will sketch out Russia’s main security political goals in the High North. Further, 
Russia’s room of manoeuvre in the field of security will be thoroughly presented and 
explained. Due to the research question of the thesis, the focus will be on Russia’s 
room of manoeuvre towards Norway.  
 
5.1 Russia in the High North – a Historical 
Perspective  
During the Cold War, the High North marked itself as a politically tense geographical 
area. The central Russian military tool in the High North, at the time, was the Russian 
Northern Navy. The area was dominated by military interests and used as a base for 
submarine presence and nuclear weapons (Oldberg 2008: 42).  
 
The end of the Cold War resulted in a military decrease in the area, due to the lack of 
funding, at the same time as the economic interests of Russia became increasingly 
dominant. This was due to high oil prices and Russia’s energy production (Oldberg 
2008: 42). 
 
5.2 Russian Interests in the High North 
When Former President Putin came to power, Russian politics became more 
centralized. There was also a period of great economic growth, which made the 
increase in military funding possible. The centralization of power led to closer ties 
between military interests and economic interests. Today, Russia’s High North policy 
is an integrated part of the country’s foreign-, military-, security-, and energy policy 
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(Oldberg 2008: 41-42). Putin also started using Russia’s energy resources as a policy 
tool meant to restore Russia’s position in the international community (Belkin 2008: 
85).  
 
Russia is a great power considering the country’s nuclear and conventional military 
potential. Furthermore, Russia’s natural resources and geo-strategic position contribute 
towards promoting Russia as a great nation (Kozyrev 2005: 198). The Foreign Policy 
Concept signed by President Dmitry Medvedev on July 12
th
 2008 strengthens the 
perception of Russia’s rising power. The document describes the country as a great 
power with a full-fledged role in global affairs and one of the most influential actors in 
the modern world. The document emphasizes that Russia has restored its international 
position and will seek to pursue national interests and goals rather than being 
influenced by the desire of other actors (de Haas 2009: 3). Among Russia’s foreign 
policy goals stated in the Foreign Policy Concept, some might be viewed as 
particularly relevant for Norway. One of these is the statement that Russia will not 
compromise its political interests in order to seek friendly relations, not even with the 
West (de Haas 2009: 3, Hedenskog et al. 2009: 16). During recent years Russia has 
also rejected the West as an ideological and political role model and wish to continue 
its development on its own terms (Blakkisrud 2007). 
 
Furthermore, the Foreign Policy Concept also states that Russia has privileged 
interests in certain regions (de Haas 2009: 3). This statement might be highly relevant 
in the High North, a region where Russia, as we have seen, clearly has special interests 
regarding natural resource extraction.  
 
In addition to the Foreign Policy Concept, Medvedev also signed a decree approving 
National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020. The document was 
signed on May 2009 and states, among other things, that in order to ensure national 
37 
 
security, Russia will prioritise social – economic concerns, such as improving the 
standard of living and economic growth (de Haas 2009: 3). Former political 
documents have also expressed the importance of these goals (Larsson 2006: 50). The 
focus on economic growth might be seen in connection to Russia’s desire to restore its 
status as a super power. The National Security Strategy reflects a desire to inform the 
world that Russian economy has augmented considerably and that Russia is back to 
play a key role in the international community (Hedenskog et al. 2009: 10). A country 
without sufficient economic wealth cannot appear to be a world super power. Despite 
the fact that Russia is one of the G 8 countries, it does not have the economic capacity 
to operate as a super power. Russia is aware of the need for a strong economy in order 
to once again rise to be great power. The switch to an economy based on capitalistic 
values can be viewed as Russia’s first step to reach a better economic position, as 
therefore country is greatly dependent on its energy sector to gain economic growth 
(Neumann 2002: 5, Larsson 2006: 33). The most secure way for Russian economy to 
continue growing is by exporting a highly needed good, such as petroleum. Not only is 
it the most secure way; it might be argued that it is the only way.  
 
When looking at what the National Security Strategy says about the High North, the 
area is clearly mentioned as a place where armed conflict potentially can take place. 
Russia stresses that it will stand prepared to protect its interests in the High North. 
Russian strategy is to deploy naval forces to the disputed area in order to protect 
Russian interests. In addition, it is evident that Russia is prepared to hold on to their 
national interests in any kind of political and/or military environment. Konstantin 
Simonov, the director of the National Energy Security Fund goes as far as to predict a 
military conflict in the High North within the next 20 years. He states that the reason 
for this is NATO’s military expansion in the High North (Solozobov 2009). This 
argument about NATO’s military presence is in coherence with Russia’s attitude 
towards the pursuit of foreign policy goals with no consideration for the interests of 
the West, and also to Russia’s hostile view towards further NATO expansion among 
former Soviet states (de Haas 2009: 4). 
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Being a geographically large and militarily capable country and a former super power, 
Russia pays relatively little attention to Norway. In Russia’s eyes, Norway stands as a 
small country of relatively little political significance. Russia sees Norway as a part of 
NATO and therefore perceives it in the same way as it does NATO (Godzimirski 
2007b: 5). The Norwegian High North, however, still remains of strategic importance 
to Russia. These interests are not all based on energy resources, but also on issues 
regarding fishing and disputes over geographical areas.  
 
5.3 Room of Manoeuvre in the field of Security 
Policy 
This study has already defined a given country’s room of manoeuvre as conditioned by 
the costs and benefits of the possible actions available to a country in any political 
situation or field. It has also been stated that “room of manoeuvre” is a relative 
concept, varying in regard to time, the political field and geographical area. How then 
might this concept be transformed to concern Russia in the High North? In other 
words, how can Russia’s room of manoeuvre in the field of security policy in the High 
North be defined?  
 
When seeking to define a country’s room of manoeuvre one needs to have a clear idea 
of what ambitions a country has towards the particular political situation. This is 
because the room of manoeuvre is, as already stated, a relative term and must be seen 
in relation to the various political goals of a country (Knutsen et al. 2000: 38). In this 
study, the focus is on Russia’s security policy towards the High North and Norway. 
The previous paragraph listed some of Russia’s most recent and most important goals 
when it comes to security policy. Although none of these seem to be aimed at Norway 
and the High North, in particular, they may nevertheless be applied to the relevant 
case. Summing up the main goals listed above, it is possible to conclude that the most 
relevant of Russia’s security policy goals are: 
39 
 
1) Increased national economy and higher living standards. 
2) Pursue national interests without regard to other countries or actors, particularly 
the West. 
3) Pursue national interests in geographical areas of great importance to Russia.  
These goals may all be related to the High North, seeing as this is a geographical area 
that is able to provide Russia with increased economic wealth. Secondly, Western 
countries dominate the High North. If we broaden our definition of the High North to 
include the whole of the Arctic, Russia stands as the only Arctic country that is not a 
member of NATO. This means that Russia’s room of manoeuvre towards Norway in 
the High North may also be interpreted as Russia’s room of manoeuvre towards 
NATO. This will not always be the case, though. When exercising foreign policy in 
the High North, Russia will be interacting either bilaterally or multilaterally with 
Norway. This is because Norway in some situations will stand alone, and in other 
situations act as a part of NATO (Berggrav 2004: 12, Holtsmark 2009b: 6). Norway is 
aware of the fact that should it come to a confrontation with Russia in the High North; 
it would be reassuring to have NATO on Norway’s side. Hence, it has been argued 
that Norway’s participation in NATO operations is a strategic one, since Norway is 
trying to guarantee support from NATO if a crisis arises with Russia in the High North 
(Rottem 2007a).    
 
Looking at Norway’s alliance with NATO one can argue that Russia’s room of 
manoeuvre in the High North depends on Norway’s relations to NATO. More 
precisely, it is tempting to argue that Russia’s room of manoeuvre might become 
broader if Norway’s ties to NATO get weakened, and it might become limited should 
NATO and Norway stand together. In the Norwegian Military’s Long- term 
Proposition no. 42 and 48, it is stated that Norway cannot expect support from all 
NATO countries should a minor conflict occur in the High North (Rottem et al. 2008: 
105). When it comes to pursuing national interests that might not be compatible with 
Norwegian interests, Russian room of manoeuvre can be said to be relatively large, 
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given the assumption that NATO will not support Norway in a potential conflict with 
Russia.  
 
A given country’s room of manoeuvre is further influenced by other countries’ 
acceptance towards its actions. The question posed here is how other countries might 
react towards Russian foreign policy actions. Support from other states might 
contribute to the widening of a country’s room of manoeuvre. This is because support 
from the world’s countries help to legitimize one’s goals and actions, thereby making 
it easier to follow through with one’s intensions (Knutsen et al. 2000: 38-40). 
Gathering support for one’s political actions, particularly in the field of security policy, 
is easier if one has allies. In Russia’s case, the country does not have any military 
allies (Schröder 2009: 6-7) Also Russia is standing against NATO, the largest military 
allied organisation in the international system. Looking at these factors it is inclining 
to argue that Russia’s room of manoeuvre is limited when it comes to gathering 
support for its policy or policy actions.  
 
Another variable, which needs to be discussed when establishing Russian’s room of 
manoeuvre towards Norway, is dependency. The idea here is that a country’s room of 
manoeuvre towards another country is dictated by their dependency of each other. A 
strong dependency decreases the room of manoeuvre (Knutsen et al. 2000: 40). If 
Russia finds itself dependent on Norway either politically or economically, Russia’s 
room of manoeuvre would become smaller than it would have not Russia been 
dependent on Norway. This argument is deeply rooted in the liberal school of 
international relations. The idea here is that dependency and integration among 
countries generally decreases the chance of conflict. Such dependency is possible to be 
created by, for example, some sort of cooperation between states (Rottem et al. 2008: 
25).  
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Looking back at the discussion presented above, concerning Norwegian participation 
in the Russian energy sector, it is obvious that energy cooperation between Russia and 
Norway may contribute to establish a dependency relationship between the two. The 
question remains: To what extent will this dependency be relevant, and who will turn 
out to be the more dependent party? Summing up the arguments, we can conclude that 
Russia is currently more dependent on Norway, as the Shtokman field production has 
not yet taken place. If the Shtokman cooperation becomes a reality, this tendency 
might change. The main reason for this potential change would be that Russia needs 
Norwegian technology. However, after the Russians gain access to the technology, 
their dependency of Norway is likely to disappear. Then again, not having the 
technology at the moment makes Russia dependent on Norway in order to be able to 
start developing the Shtokman field. Russia has been hesitant to engage in cooperation 
with Western companies, perhaps precisely in order to avoid ending up in a 
dependency relationship. The Russians also wanted to prevent Western countries from 
gaining economic wealth from Russian resources. Russia’s Former President Putin 
made it clear that Western companies would only gain access to Russian fields if they 
could provide Russia with something that was not within Russian capability 
(Godzimirski 2007a: 7). This way of political reasoning is clearly in accordance with 
the neorealist notions of a zero-sum game.   
 
Finally, the room of manoeuvre is determined by a country’s internal opinion. Russia 
is as shown, a highly centralized state and also a state of internal instability. 
Furthermore, though Russia is formally a democracy, there does not appear to be a 
tolerance for democratic expressions from the Russian people as well as the freedom 
of speech seems to be considerably limited (Utgaard 2005: 2). These characteristics 
could point to the conclusion that Russia’s room of manoeuvre is broad, as it does not 
have to take as much concern to its citizens’ opinions as a fully democratic country 
would.   
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5.4 The Link Between Russian Aspirations and 
Russian Resources 
There is another significant variable concerning the room of manoeuvre in the field of 
security policy, which is material power. This variable is particularly important when 
trying to analyze security policy by the use of neorealism. The large military forces of 
Russia during the Cold War made the country capable of maintaining a wide room of 
manoeuvre, thereby enabling it to maintain the status as one of two great powers in a 
bipolar world.   
 
When looking at Russia’s room of manoeuvre towards Norway, in the field of security 
policy, it is important to keep a balanced view of Russia. This means that it is 
important to neither underestimate nor overestimate Russia’s will and ability to use 
traditional military force. We have already discussed that Russia has proven to be 
capable of military use, and also that its National Security Strategy states the country’s 
will to do it again, should they find such measures necessary. However, although 
Russia portrays itself as a great power, the country fails to be convincing regarding 
certain important issues. It is far from evident that the actual situation of Russia is 
enough to support its international ambitions. The Russian military is undergoing a 
process of modernization, but it is also struggling with internal disagreements, 
shortage of staff and insufficient funding (Flikke, not dated, Hedenskog et al. 2009: 
21).  The economic growth of Russia is still under a lot of pressure and there are 
doubts to whether Russia will manage to sustain the rearmament it has begun, as the 
military capability will be dependent on economic growth (Hedenskog et al. 2009: 28, 
Holtsmark 2009b: 5).  
 
As shown, Russia is militarily weaker now, compared to the days of the Cold War. 
Russia’s national economy and the average living standard is far below that of a 
medium sized West European country. Russia also has a geographically large territory 
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to defend, though its military forces are relatively weak for a country aspiring to 
restore its hegemonic status (Schröder 2009: 6-7). Even though the Cold War has 
ended and the tensions between Russia and the West have declined, the National 
Security Strategy sketches a rather traditional view of the West. The document 
portrays the West as an external military enemy. This view of the West is also 
reflected in the resistance Russia is showing when it comes to further NATO 
expansion among the former Soviet states (de Haas 2009: 4). This shows that even 
though the Cold War has ended, Russia still regards the West as a potential enemy, 
though perhaps no longer for the same reasons.  
 
Although Russia’s status and position during the 1990s was significantly weakened, 
compared to the days of the Cold War, Russia is slowly restoring its old status as a 
great power. When it comes to material power, Russia has increased its military. The 
military is however not sufficiently large to give Russia global capabilities, but it is 
large enough to make Russia a regional superpower. However, if putting aside the size 
of the Russian military, Russia still stands out to regarding its material power. What 
gives the country a unique status when it comes to material power is the fact that 
Russia is a nuclear power (Rottem et al. 2008: 103).  
 
It was stated above that there are uncertainties related to whether or not NATO would 
support Norway in a conflict with Russia. Should NATO decide not to get involved, 
Russia’s room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis Norway would probably increase. There is, 
however, no certain way of knowing when NATO will support Norway, therefore 
Russia needs to consider the possibility of NATO’s involvement, before acting 
aggressively towards Norway. According to ”Healey’s Theorem”3, a 95 per cent 
likelihood of NATO’s involvement in a crisis between Russia and Norway would not 
be reassuring enough for Norway to feel safe. However, only a 5 per cent possibility of 
                                                 
3
 Denis Healey is a former Labour chancellor and was the British secretary of state for 
defense from 1964 to 1970 (Openvault 2006). 
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NATO’s engagement would be enough to deter Russia (Sharp 1985: 660). This shows 
that Russia’s inclination to attack Norway is not as great. Moreover, in order to 
employ military use, the costs of doing so must be lower than the costs of choosing not 
to do so. It is important to stress that military use is not the only approach to a 
disagreement or conflict, and is not the only imaginable outfall if a confrontation 
between Russia and Norway occurs in the High North.  
 
The “Elektron” incident from 2005 is an example of how a crisis that had the potential 
to escalate into a military conflict between Russia and Norway was resolved through 
the use of diplomacy. On October 15
th
 2005, the Norwegian coast guard arrested the 
Russian trawler Elektron for fishing illegally in the Fisheries Protection Zone outside 
of Svalbard. The captain of the Elektron, Valery Yarentsev, objected to the arrest, 
arguing that Norway had no right to arrest the trawler, as its activities were under 
Russian, not Norwegian, fishery law. Two Norwegian coast guard inspectors boarded 
the Elektron, and captain Yarantsev was given orders to follow the Norwegian coast 
guard cutter KV Tromsø, to the port of Tromsø for criminal proceedings. The captain 
of the Elektron did not obey the orders, and on October the 16
th
, the Elektron changed 
its course and headed for the Cola Peninsula instead of Tromsø. This was the 
beginning of a several days long chase, where KV Tromsø, along with other 
Norwegian coast guard vessels and helicopters followed the Elektron until it reached 
Russian territorial waters. Russia’s response to the incident was restrained and calm, 
both from the Russian Navy and from the Russian Defense Minister, Sergei Ivanov. 
They did not react in an aggressive manner to the arrest, but rather highlighted that this 
did not represent a threat to Russian-Norwegian relations and that it would not lead to 
an armed conflict between the two countries. The crisis was resolved through 
diplomatic consultations at the foreign minister level (Åtland and Bruusgaard 2009: 
340-343). The Elektron example illustrates that even though Russia is investing more 
in its military capabilities in the north, the military option will not always be the one 
employed. However, Russia’s non-use of power must be seen with connection to 
Norway’s non-use of power. The situation could have played out very differently, had 
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Norway mobilized its special forces to recover the two Norwegian coast guard 
inspectors who were onboard of the Elektron.  
 
Russia is evidently developing its economy, thereby enabling itself to invest more 
money in the nation’s armed forces. Nevertheless, it is not given that Russia will be 
able to fulfil its military ambitions, concerning stronger presence in the High North. 
There are still uncertainties regarding Russia’s long-term economic growth. As shown 
above, the Shtokman field is the largest gas field in the world and Russia’s source to 
increasing economic wealth and political power. However, Russia is unable to develop 
the field without assistance from foreign companies. Should these companies 
withdraw from the cooperation or be excluded from it by Russia, it is not certain that 
Russia will have the capacity to develop the gas field, at least not for a long period of 
time. Such an incident would undoubtedly slow down the Russian economic 
development. Should the economic growth be hindered, this would also decrease 
Russia’s ability to sustain its ambitious rearmament programs (Holtsmark 2009a: 8).    
 
5.5 Summary of Russia’s Room of Manoeuvre  
So far we have explored Russia’s room of manoeuvre towards Norway on the basis of 
three variables: Support from other countries, dependency and material power. The 
extend of the manoeuvre room seems to vary from variable to variable. When it comes 
to increasing one’s room of manoeuvre by seeking support from other countries and 
legitimizing one’s purposes, Russia is apparently scoring low. This is because Russia 
does not have any allies, while Norway has NATO. Moreover Russia broadens its 
room of manoeuvre by stating in the Foreign Policy Concept of 2008 that they do not 
seek to attain accept for their policy actions or to please other states. In order to 
maintain such an attitude, Russia needs to obtain sufficient resources when it comes to 
the third criterion that has been discussed: the material power. With regard to material 
power, Russia is weakened compared to the days of the Cold War. However there is an 
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increasing focus on building up the military to be able to protect Russian interests in 
the High North. Also, as mentioned above, Russia’s material strength lies in the fact 
that it possesses nuclear weapons.  
 
One can conclude that in terms of material power, Russia’s room of manoeuvre 
towards Norway is relatively wide. This is especially the case if Norway does not 
receive support from NATO in a potential conflict. In order to sustain strong military 
power, Russia needs sufficient funding and economic growth. The largest and most 
reliable source of further economic growth is continued development of the energy 
sector, such as the beginning of energy production in the Barents Sea. As long as 
Norway does not enter energy cooperation with Russia, the Russians will not have the 
needed technological expertise to start production. This makes Russia dependent of 
Norway to help them develop their gas fields in order to secure further economic 
wealth. Although Russia’s room of manoeuvre seems relatively broad on the basis of 
the first and the third factor, it is currently reasonable to argue that it appears narrow 
when it comes to the second factor. 
 
 
47 
 
6 Norway 
This chapter will examine Norway’s policy towards the High North. First it will give a 
historical overview of Norway’s role in the High North. Secondly, it will highlight 
Norway’s interests in the High North, in terms of foreign policy, security policy and 
also energy policy. In the third section of the chapter, there will be a discussion on 
Norway’s room of manoeuvre in the field of security policy towards Russia.  
 
6.1 Norway in the High North – a Historical 
Perspective 
The High North adopted the status of securitized area during the Cold War, as it 
became a strategically important geographical area.  Norway’s place in international 
affairs was defined as being a small NATO country and the neighbour of the clearly 
labelled Western enemy, the Soviet Union. As Norway was the Soviet Union’s closest 
northern neighbour, the country needed to be constantly prepared and ready to respond 
to a Soviet threat. Through the prioritizing of the High North regarding military 
presence, Norway contributed to the NATO alliance and was considered a significant 
ally. NATO, in return, supported Norwegian High North policy and guaranteed 
support to Norway in a potential conflict. The alliance also spent considerable amounts 
of money to finance Norwegian policy measures in the High North (Berggrav 2004: 
3).   
 
Norway’s strategy towards Russia, at the time, can be summed up with two concepts, 
deterrence and reassurance (Skogan 2001: 22). Through its alliance with NATO, 
Norway used the organisation as a tool of exercising “Realpolitik”. NATO provided 
Norway with the capacity to have a large defence present in the High North. Secondly, 
Norway practised a policy of reassurance. This was done by limiting the military 
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activity in the country and also by being a territory free of nuclear weapons (Rottem 
2007b: 64-65). 
 
6.2 Norwegian Interests in the High North 
Like Russia, Norway has vast energy interests in the High North. But unlike Russia, 
Norway has not yet found reserves as large as those of Russia. Therefore, Norway has 
an interest in cooperating with Russia, as they are the ones with the largest 
undeveloped petroleum fields. Though Russia has large petroleum resources, they lack 
the technological ability to develop these. Norway, on the other hand, has the 
technological opportunities needed in the offshore petroleum industry, but limited 
internal markets. By engaging in pioneer projects such as Statfjord, Ormen Lange and 
Snøhvit, Norway has gained technological skills required when developing petroleum 
in the north. Moreover, Norway has built firm infrastructure needed for the petroleum 
industry. Additionally, Norway possesses knowledge concerning the environmental 
issues in the High North. Such knowledge is needed in order to prevent accidents that 
might lead to environmental hazards. Russia lacks both the technology and experience 
needed to engage in projects such as Shtokman (Johnsen 2006: 13-14). 
  
Though Norway has an interest in cooperating with Russia in order to get access to 
Russian fields, it is important to highlight that this is not the only Norwegian interest 
in the High North. When regarding Norwegian interests in this area, it should be 
stressed that the various interests need to be viewed as a whole. Norway has territorial 
interests, energy interests, interests regarding fishing and environmental interests. As a 
consequence it is crucial for Norway to maintain a policy that will look after all of its 
main concerns. 
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One of Norway’s main interests in the High North is to assert its sovereignty and 
sovereign rights in the area. Chapter 1 showed that Russia and Norway still have failed 
to reach an agreement on where to draw the line between the countries’ economic 
zones, which has resulted in the establishment of two temporary agreements, namely 
the one of the disputed area and the Grey Zone agreement. Another territorial 
disagreement is the one of the Svalbard continental shelf. The Svalbard Treaty of 1920 
gave Norway sovereignty over the land area of Svalbard. Additionally, the Treaty 
provided all the signing nations and their companies the right to residence, industrial 
and maritime activity, fishing and hunting (Governor of Svalbard 2008). There are all-
together 39 countries associated to the Svalbard Treaty, among these Russia, the US 
and several EU states (Fife 2009). Today’s disagreement concerns whether or not the 
principle of equal rights should apply to the continental shelf and waters beyond the 
territorial waters of Svalbard as well (Raaen 2008:25). Norway’s official respond to 
this issue is that the Treaty’s equal treatment provisions only apply on the mainland of 
Svalbard and not offshore. Russia, on the other hand, holds the view that the 
continental shelf of Svalbard is part of the international seabed and therefore that the 
privilege of engaging in fishing and petroleum activity there, is not a right belonging 
exclusively to Norway  (Jensen and Rottem 2009: 6).  
 
The end of the Cold War considerably lowered the possibility of Norway being 
invaded by Russian forces. Today, an invasion is seen as unlikely, and Norway is 
continuously making efforts to strengthen its relationship to Russia and to further 
develop cooperative bonds between the two countries. However, Norway is not blind 
to the fact that Russia is a great power and that Norway is a small country in 
comparison. Consequently, the relationship between the two, though friendly, will 
develop asymmetrically, and therefore be a challenging task for Norwegian security 
policy (Godzimirski 2007b: 7). The striking differences between the two countries, in 
both size and power have traditionally made Norway reluctant about making bilateral 
agreements with Russia, as the factor of asymmetry is unavoidable (Hønneland 
2005:44). In order to even out this tendency of asymmetry, Norway seeks for NATO 
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to confirm their support of Norway in the High North and to re-establish its focus on 
the High North. Norway has expressed concerns connected to the High North, and 
oriented NATO of the challenges the country could be facing there (Strøm-Eriksen 
2009).  
 
Another important issue area for Norway is the environment. In order to get the most 
out of the natural resources, such as fish and petroleum, it is necessary to keep the area 
free of environmental accidents. It is therefore in Norway’s interest to make sure that 
the Russian petroleum industry operates in a way that protects the environment. An 
environmental crisis on the Russian side of the High North will have large 
consequences for the Norwegian side of the High North as well (Johnsen 2006: 9-10). 
Russian oil and LNG tankers may pose an environmental danger for Norway, and it is 
thus in the country’s interest to keep from operating too close to Norwegian shores. 
Norway will in such case need support from NATO, as it is challenging for Norway to 
approach Russia alone, on such a matter. This is to an extent related to Russian 
reluctance towards Norwegian environmental concerns, as shown above, as Russia 
often considers these to be a way of suppressing Russian economic and industrial 
growth, for instance on Svalbard. Though Norway’s economic and commercial 
interests might benefit from Russian cooperation, the country’s security and 
environmental interests might be jeopardised (Jaffe 2007: 16).  
 
In order to help prevent environmental disasters, Norway also participates in the work 
of securing the Russian nuclear power plants located near Norwegian borders. Norway 
assist with the means needed to provide measures that will lower the chances of 
accidents on the plants. In addition, Norway is also involved in the work of storing 
nuclear waste (Lodgaard 2005: 38). 
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6.3 Norway’s Room of Manoeuvre vis-à-vis 
Russia 
Norway’s room of manoeuvre in the field of security policy has been described as a 
triangle, with the three corners containing of Russia, the U.S. and the EU (Neumann 
2002: 2, Rottem et al. 2008: 33). This will imply that although Norway’s room of 
manoeuvre is, as previously stated, relative, Norway at the same time needs to take 
these three actors into consideration when making its foreign policy. Moreover, the 
corners of the U.S. and the EU are crucial when it comes to Norway’s dealings with 
the corner of Russia. This is the corner we are interested in here, as the purpose is to 
define Norway’s room of manoeuvre towards Russia, in particular. The way of looking 
at Norway’s room of manoeuvre differs somewhat from the way of looking at Russia’s 
room of manoeuvre. This relates mainly to the fact that Norway is a part of a larger 
alliance, and needs to consider its room of manoeuvre in the field of security policy 
accordingly.  
 
In order to widen its room of manoeuvre towards Russia, Norway needs to be 
reassured that it has support from NATO. This support will not necessarily be granted 
as Norway’s position and relevance in NATO has been marginalized after the Cold 
War (Græger, not dated). Norway should therefore seek to act in a way that will 
appear beneficial to the largest NATO country, namely the US, in order to secure their 
backing. This takes us to the point of widening one’s room of manoeuvre by making 
one’s policy compelling to others, thereby gaining their support (Knutsen et al. 2000: 
38-39). It is important for Norway to lead a policy towards the Russians that will be 
attractive to NATO and the US.  
 
Norway strives to make sure that the relations it makes with Russia are compatible 
with USA and NATO’s Russia-policy. This is so that NATO and the US do not feel 
alienated and end up abandoning Norway in the High North (Neumann 2002: 3). 
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Moreover, it is also important to maintain a policy that will not create distance 
between Norway and the EU. Russia’s relations to the EU might affect EU’s support 
for Norway’s High North interests, should Norway pursue a policy that prioritises 
relations with Russia over relations with the EU (Mitchell 2007: 91). In order to 
reassure support against the Russians in the High North, should such be needed, 
Norway needs to approach Russia in a way that will offend neither the US and NATO, 
nor the EU. At the same time, Norway must make sure that it does not prioritise any 
bilateral relation to such a degree that it weakens other bilateral relations. In other 
words, the US and NATO must not feel that Norway chooses EU relations over 
relations with them, and opposite. Should Norway distance itself from both its allies, it 
may find itself standing alone with Russia (Neumann 2002: 3-4). Though the EU is a 
part of Norway’s security policy triangle, it is plausible to argue that Norway under 
current conditions should seek to prioritize its relations with NATO, and especially the 
US, over its relations to the EU. This is because Norway, not being a member of the 
EU, cannot count on much support from the EU in the first place (Godzimirski 2007b: 
6-7, Ulriksen, not dated). NATO, on the other hand, is legally committed to assist its 
allies should such assistance be needed. This idea is rooted in NATO’s Article 5, 
stating that the attack of one NATO country should be considered as an attack on the 
whole alliance (The North Atlantic Treaty 1949). Whether or not the USA, which is 
the strongest of the NATO countries, will follow through on their commitments and 
how, is another question. 
 
Alliances can both increase and decrease a country’s room of manoeuvre. As was 
shown in chapter 5, Russia has no allies it needs to consider when pursuing its national 
interests. This increases the country’s room of manoeuvre, as it is not dependent on 
other actors to enforce its policy. Likewise, Norway’s room of manoeuvre in the field 
of security policy towards Russia might increase with the proper reassurance that 
NATO, especially, will give Norway support in a potential conflict with the Russians 
in the High North. The widening of Norway’s room of manoeuvre towards Russia in 
the field of security policy by securing support from NATO, will consequently narrow 
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Norway’s room of manoeuvre in other policy fields. It may not stand as freely when 
pursuing foreign policy interest in the High North, as it has to take the interests of 
others into consideration as well as their own. 
 
The chapter on Russia stated that a country’s room of manoeuvre might further be 
widened or narrowed by its dependence, or lack thereof, on the country it is interacting 
with. We saw that Russia has a dependency relationship towards Norway, as Norway 
possesses the technology Russia needs to develop their offshore gas fields. This 
dependency was considered to be rather significant, as Russia needs the incomes of 
new gas fields in order to continue growing economically and thereby sustain its 
position as a great power. Thus, it is probably fair to say that there is a reciprocal 
dependency between the two countries. Norway has experience with offshore 
operations in the Arctic waters and possesses the technological tools, while Russia has 
large natural resources on their side, which Norway wants access to. The question to 
be posed is whose dependency is the strongest? The country with the strongest 
dependency on the other state will have the least room of manoeuvre. 
 
We have seen that what makes Russia’s dependency on Norwegian technology severe 
is that Russian petroleum industry is closely connected to the country’s vital interests 
of being a great power. In relation to Norway, one must differentiate between 
Norway’s vital interests as a country and the commercial or economic interests of 
Norwegian companies, such as those of Statoil (formerly StatoilHydro). Norway is a 
country with an oil consumption that is considerably lower than the country’s output 
potential. Moreover, Norway has still ongoing production in the North Sea, as well as 
considerable resources in the High North, though they are not as large as those of 
Russia. Contrary to Russia, Norway is not trying to position itself as a great power. 
Neither does Norway need Russian petroleum to meet the needs of its citizens at 
home. Thereby, Norway’s interests in the Russian High North are not directly 
connected to vital national interests, such as energy security. Norway’s interests in the 
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Shtokman and the Yamal – Nenets fields can thus be viewed as either purely 
commercial or as a way of strengthening the Norwegian-Russian foreign policy 
relations through cooperation (Jaffe 2007: 17-18). This makes Norway’s dependency 
of Russia less strong than Russia’s dependence of Norway, as Russian interests in 
Norwegian technology are closely connected to the country’s national interests as a 
whole. Considering these factors, Norway’s room of manoeuvre seems larger than 
Russia’s. 
 
The room of manoeuvre is also determined by the power a country possesses, being 
either material, like in Russia’s case, or revolving around soft power. “Soft power” is 
the ability to affect the political agenda in a way that shapes the political preference of 
other actors. It is the ability a country has of attracting others to agree with their policy 
direction. Soft power is about making one’s values appealing to others, so that they 
choose to follow your example. Soft power is an alternative to the material power 
consisting of military, weapons and economy (Nye 2002: 552). Norway has positioned 
itself as having considerable soft power on the international stage. Here Norway has 
taken the lead of being a country encouraging to peace negotiations, understanding, 
diplomacy and the promotion of human rights (Knutsen et al. 2000: 39, Rottem 2007b: 
81). 
 
Though strong when it comes to soft power, Norway is also in possession of a certain 
amount of hard power. This is where Norway’s position as an energy power matters. 
Natural resources also matter when it comes to the room of manoeuvre (Knutsen et al. 
2000: 39). Although Norway is a rather small country compared to Russia and other 
great actors on the international arena, the country is a great power when it comes to 
energy (Noreng 2007: 95, Rottem et al. 2008: 30). As economic power is a part of hard 
power, Norway gains hard power through their strong economy built on petroleum 
resources. Russia, on the other hand, only possesses hard power. The combination of 
both soft and hard power might increase Norway’s room of manoeuvre in the field of 
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security policy towards Russia in the High North. It is important to stress that soft 
power in itself may not necessarily be of great importance: it is rather the 
consequences of soft power that might help widen Norway’s room of manoeuvre. Nye 
specifies that soft power lies in the ability to make one’s policy attractive to others. 
Therefore, the soft power that Norway has might contribute towards attracting support 
for Norway’s High North policy, as indicated above. 
 
When it comes to hard power in terms of military capabilities, NATO is Norway’s best 
tool. Since NATO’s interest of the High North region has declined in the years after 
the Cold War, so has Norway’s ability to practice Realpolitik in the area. Though 
Norway and the US are still in alliance, Norway cannot be certain that the US will 
follow up on their commitments through NATO and support Norway against the 
Russians (Rottem 2007b: 70). Norway therefore needs its own military power. It is 
important to have military presence in strategically important areas such as the High 
North (Lodgaard 2005: 40).  
 
One of Norway’s central tools here is the Norwegian Coast Guard, patrolling the 
northern waters. The Coast Guard’s duties include presence in the area in order to 
mark Norwegian sovereignty, controlling the fishing activity in the area, rescue 
services and environmental control. Though the Coast Guard is an integrated part of 
the Norwegian military system, it is responsible for civil duties as well as military. 
This tones down the Coast Guard’s military agenda and presents the institution as a 
less aggressive military source. Their presence is therefore, though noticed, not viewed 
as aggressive (Rottem et al. 2008: 39-50, Rottem 2007b: 72-74). However, it is 
important not to undermine the importance of the Norwegian Navy as a whole, when 
talking about the High North. The Norwegian Navy’s main responsibilities include 
asserting Norwegian sovereignty and preventing crises. This is to be achieved by close 
surveillance of the area and by maintaining a strong presence in the High North 
(Christensen 2006: 3). The focus on the High North has received increased attention 
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the recent time, and in 2009 the Navy conducted a large military exercise in the area, 
called “Presence in Northern Norway” (Trøtt 2009).  
 
6.4 Summary of Norway’s Room of Manoeuvre 
The section above has shown that Norway’s Room of manoeuvre depends greatly on 
whether or not NATO (and particularly the US) will support us in a potential crisis. 
This again depends on Norway’s ability to make its policy in the High North attractive 
to NATO. Norway possesses a great power status when it comes to being an energy 
producer and exporter, in addition to having considerable soft power. These are 
qualities one can argue should enable Norway to get NATO on its side. As the analysis 
will show, however, this will depend on how one chooses to angle the situation. The 
material power of Norway, in terms of military power, is weak without NATO. This 
makes Norway’s manoeuvre room fairly limited, should the country find itself without 
NATO’s support. The one variable where Norway scores high and which broadens 
Norway’s room of manoeuvre, is that of dependency. Norway has its own petroleum 
reserves and the ability to exploit them. Thus, it is not of vital importance to Norway 
as a country to get access to Russian fields. It is, though, necessary for Russia to get 
access to foreign offshore technology, the Norwegian being the leading.  
 
The analysis below will broaden the understanding of how, why and which of the two 
countries will have the largest room of manoeuvre, based on the theoretical 
assumptions that have been employed. It is important to stress that the two applied 
theories concentrate on states as sovereign and unitary actors and therefore have their 
ontological focus on the state as a whole. Therefore, the variable on the public opinion 
inside each country will not be visible through the analysis.  
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7 Theoretical Perspectives on 
Cooperation and Room of Manoeuvre  
 
This chapter will use the analytical tools of neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism 
to make an estimation of how the respectively Russian and Norwegian room of 
manoeuvre towards the other might be affected by petroleum cooperation. 
 
7.1 The Perspective of Neorealism 
The chapter on theory sketched the neorealist view on cooperation between states. To 
sum up, neorealists find cooperation between states hard due to their emphasis on 
relative gains (Powell 1991: 1303).  The focus on relative gains has been deeply rooted 
in Russian foreign policy since the Cold War. In the Cold War period, the international 
structure was dominated by a bipolar system, in which each of the two sides 
considered their own gain to be the other one’s loss. Foreign policy was, in other 
words seen as a ”zero-sum game” (Donaldson and Nogee 2005: 229). As previously 
mentioned, Russia is now a highly centralized state, a characteristic that was 
introduced during Putin’s years as President (Helm 2007: 20). Russia thus appears as a 
state in accordance to the neorealist definition emphasizing that countries operate as 
unitary actors, with a primary goal of survival (Grieco 1988: 488). The zero-sum 
perspective is still evident in Russia’s policies in the High North, and there is 
widespread concern among Russian policy-makers that outside states or non-state 
actors may try to take control of valuable natural resources belonging to Russia.  
 
Neorealism applies the relative gain assumption for both economics and security. 
These two are connected since economic gains may in the end result to gains in the 
field of security (Snidal 1991: 703). This relates to what was previously discussed 
about Russia needing economic growth in order to restore its status as a great power 
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and pursue and protect national interests. Thereby, Russia seeks to develop its 
petroleum resources in order to restore its economy. As we have seen in the High 
North, conflicts of interests tend to occur when Norwegian environmentalists protests 
against or hinder Russia’s approach regarding natural resources in an environmentally 
fragile area. In such situations, Norway is often perceived as having a hidden hard 
security agenda. The Russians, seeing the world through the eyes of realism, view this 
as a way of lowering Russia’s relative gains and weakening their chance of 
development.   
 
Chapter 5 and 6 gave a discussion of respectively Russia and Norway’s room of 
manoeuvre vis-à-vis the other, in the field of security policy. The analysis below will 
use neorealist assumptions to investigate which of the two countries would have the 
broadest room of manoeuvre in the field of security, given cooperation in the energy 
sector. The assumptions of neorealism will emphasise the importance of some of the 
factors, while not granting much importance to others.  
 
When it comes to the criteria of dependency, we concluded that Norway’s room of 
manoeuvre is broader than Russia’s, due to Russian dependency of Norwegian 
technology in order to go ahead with their offshore production. When two states are 
cooperating, dependency among them will never be absent. According to neorealism, 
dependency makes states vulnerable (Waltz 1979). In this case, Norway is dependent 
on Russia because of their gas fields, whereas Russia is dependent of Norwegian 
technology in order to develop the fields. As Russia’s security policy and national 
interests evolve around their energy production, it is possible to argue that Russia to a 
certain extent is dependent on Norway to bring about economic growth, and therefore 
indirectly national security as well. If the Norwegian offshore technology wishes to 
develop further it needs to expand its markets, as the domestic market is too small. On 
November 4
th
, 2009, Aftenposten wrote that Norwegian petroleum technology 
suppliers are struggling due to the credit crunch and the lack of domestic customers. 
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One company, specialized in providing offshore technology, had to dismiss over 500 
employees because of the lack of orders (Harbo 2009).  
 
The Russian energy market is an option Norway can turn to in order to find new 
projects where Norwegian petroleum technology can be utilized. Should, however, 
large parts of the Norwegian petroleum industry get too involved in Russia, this could 
alter the dependency relationship between the countries, making Norway more 
dependent of the Russian market than Russia is on Norwegian technology. The 
Norwegian companies could become victims of Russia’s vague laws, rules and diffuse 
business agreements. This could lead Norwegian industry down the same path that the 
Norwegian company Telenor had to walk. Telenor invested in the Russian telecom 
company VimpelCom, and was later accused by Ferimax, a small VimpelCom 
investor, of preventing VimpelCom from expanding in Ukraine, thereby causing the 
company to lose large amounts of money. The case was taken to the court in Siberia, 
where Telenor’s stocks in VimpelCom were confiscated, as compensation for the 
alleged loss. Telenor suspects their Russian partner Alfa, and its owner, the oligarch 
Mikhail Friedman to stand behind the small investor Ferimax and their claim of 
Telenor’s stocks (Haugnes and Mørch Larsen 2009, Hagen 2009). Recently, the 
disagreements have been ended, and solved by a merger between Telenor’s Russian 
and Ukrainian assets with those of the Alfa Group. The merged assets will form a new 
company worth $24 billion (White and Bland 2009, The Economist 2009). Researcher 
Arild Moe argues that the Telenor affair should be a warning for Statoil when 
considering engaging in cooperation with Gazprom on Shtokman (Trellevik 2009).  
 
Norway needs to consider its costs and benefits when it comes to cooperation with 
Russia. It is therefore necessary for Norway to reconsider if its short-term commercial 
interests would be gained at the expense of more vital long-term interests. In this 
regard it is important to take into account long-term economic and security interests, as 
well as the long-term interests of Norwegian companies operating in Russia. 
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Moreover, it is important to emphasize that while Norway needs Russia primarily for 
its petroleum fields, Russia needs Norway primarily for its technology. The difference 
between these two goods is that the latter is portable while the former is not. What 
happens to the dependency relationship when Russia eventually attains the technology 
that it is now dependent on? Statoil might enter the Shtokman field with anticipations 
of working together with Gazprom throughout both the starting phase and the 
production phase of the project. However, there is no guarantee that Gazprom will 
keep Statoil as a partner in the production phase if they acquire the technology they 
need in the first phase. Statoil would then risk being excluded from the Shtokman 
project after the Norwegian technology finds its way into Russian hands. This could 
cause Statoil considerable economic loss, and also broaden Russia’s room of 
manoeuvre, as the dependency relationship would shift. Russia would probably be 
more dependent on Norway and Statoil in the start-up phase than in the production 
phase. In the long run, this may put Norway and Statoil in a vulnerable situation.   
 
The leader of the Norwegian environmental agency Bellona has warned Norwegian 
companies from entering cooperation with Russian Gazprom. He also stresses the 
possibility of Russia using the Shtokman project as a way of gaining access to 
Norwegian technology, so they can use it on other fields where Norway is not 
involved as a partner (Leirset 2006). The Norwegian Police Security Service points out 
in their annual report from 2009, that there is ongoing activity of intelligence gathering 
in Norway. This is mostly in order to obtain information concerning the Norwegian 
petroleum industry and petroleum research. The goal of the espionage is, according to 
the Police Security Service, to collect information that will strengthen Russia’s 
position, while potentially weakening Norway’s (PST 2008).  
 
Both of these examples show how cooperation can turn the dependency variable, 
making Norway more dependent of Russia than the other way around. The examples 
also show the essence of neorealism’s relative gain and zero-sum assumptions. The 
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largest state is often the most likely to gain from cooperation whereas the smaller and 
weaker party loses. Here, the loss in connection to cooperation is interpreted as a 
narrowing of the room of manoeuvre. Receiving access to Norwegian technology will 
automatically lead to a situation where Norway’s loss becomes Russia’s gain.   
 
Gathering support for one’s actions increases the room of manoeuvre in the field of 
security policy (Knutsen et al. 2000). The chapter on Russia showed how the country 
explicitly states that it will pursue its own interests in the High North, no matter what 
other countries, particularly Western, may say about it. This is a typical example of 
neorealist policy, where the sovereign state seeks to fulfil national interests, 
disregarding the wishes of others (Waltz 1979). Moreover, Russia can rely on its own 
military capabilities, making the country independent of foreign military assistance 
(Hedenskog et al. 2009: 10). 
 
Norway, on the other hand, is eager to oblige other states, particularly the US. This is 
not surprising, as it is more important for small states to maintain good relations with 
their allies than it is for larger states or great powers (Græger, not dated). By making 
Norwegian interests and actions attractive to the US, Norway hopes to gain their 
support and thereby enlarge Norway’s room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis Russia. 
Neorealism stresses that states, particularly powerful ones seek to fulfil their own 
national interests. With such an assumption one could conclude that if it is in US’ and 
NATO’s interests to support Norway, they will.  
 
This thesis has previously stated that the US primarily seeks to ensure its own 
interests. Securing one’s own interests is one of the core assumptions of neorealism. 
This is a characteristic deeply rooted in the mentality of US foreign policy and will 
probably not be greatly altered by the election of a new president (Ørnhøi, not dated). 
The most important variable in the eyes of neorealism, when it comes to power are 
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material power assets (Waltz 1979). Thereby it is unlikely to assume that Norway’s 
soft power will have any affect on a large, goal-pursuing state like the US. The chapter 
on Norway pointed out that Norway does have a certain amount of hard power as well. 
This is mostly in the form of natural resources. One must, however be careful and not 
assume that power resources are the same as power itself. Though sitting on vast 
amounts of petroleum resources may be powerful in some situations, it also may be a 
liability in other (Baldwin 2002: 179). An example of how the resources may turn out 
to be unfortunate for Norway is if there were to be a race over the natural resources in 
the High North, potentially destabilizing the region. A scenario such as this, though 
not expected in the near future, cannot be ruled out completely (Granholm 2008: 14).  
 
A similar scenario could occur in relation to the question of sovereignty and sovereign 
rights on the Svalbard continental shelf. Several of the countries that have signed the 
Treaty argue that rules regarding foreign presence on the Svalbard land area also 
should apply also to the continental shelf. Norway, however, holds another point of 
view, claiming that these principles only refer to the land area of Svalbard, whereas the 
continental shelf belongs solely to Norway (Rottem et. al 2008: 52). Rising energy 
demands worldwide could eventually lead to a desire to investigate whether there are 
petroleum resources located in the continental shelf around Svalbard (Raaen 2008: 28).  
 
If a conflict between Russia and Norway should arise concerning possible petroleum 
resources on Svalbard’s continental shelf, it would not be certain that Norway would 
receive support from NATO. As the US and several other European NATO countries 
also have potential interests on the Svalbard continental shelf, neorealism would argue 
that the states would pursue their own interests in preference to help protect Norway’s 
national interests. Protecting Norway, in such a matter, would lead to a zero-sum 
result, where the NATO countries associated to the Svalbard Treaty lose possible 
petroleum resources whereas Norway gains them. This would make Norway an even 
stronger petroleum nation, making the other countries additionally more dependent on 
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the Norwegian petroleum. After the Cold War, NATO has, according to neorealism, 
lost its task of protecting Western Europe from the Soviet Union. Instead, the US uses 
NATO as a tool of controlling the foreign policy of West European states (Waltz 2000: 
208). According to neorealist assumptions, the US and NATO will support Norway 
against Russia in the High North, if such an action is viewed as favourable to the US. 
Moreover, this is not just a question of national interest, but also one concerning 
relative gains. Neorealists would say that, particularly in such a politically sensitive 
area, the US would fear what Norway might gain if they were to cooperate against 
Russia in the High North (Keohane and Martin 1995: 45). Hence, Russia appears to 
have the wider room of manoeuvre of the two in relation to material power. It is 
important to once again stress that this depends on the direction NATO decides to 
take, namely if the organisation supports Norway or not.  
 
Should Norway change its Svalbard policy and meet the policy interests of the other 
Treaty states, this could lead to a guarantee that NATO will follow up on its 
commitments in a confrontation between Norway and Russia. Though Norway thus 
could gain international support against Russia, the country would also suffer a great 
loss regarding sovereignty and possible petroleum resources. Even though a country is 
capable of altering its policy in order to gain a larger room of manoeuvre, it needs to 
consider the costs and benefits related to such actions (Knutsen et al. 200: 38). 
 
It seems that an absent NATO would increase Russia’s room of manoeuvre, as this 
would leave Norway to face Russia alone. Likewise, should NATO, and mainly the 
US, stay loyal to their commitments and stand by Norway, Russia’s room of 
manoeuvre would shrink. The certainties regarding USA’s will to follow up on their 
obligations through NATO are small, should we believe Norwegian scholars. NATO is 
argued to be a tool of US foreign policy, used by the US to be applied in their favour. 
Furthermore, the USA is viewed as a country seeking to promote and achieve its own 
interests. In other words, NATO will support Norway only if it is in US’ interests to do 
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so (Rieker, not dated, Ørnhøi, not dated). This belief relates to neorealist 
considerations of sovereign states as being the main actors on the international arena, 
thereby limiting the power and influence of institutions. States seek to maximize their 
own power and achieve national objectives (Waltz 1979).  
 
Considering the countries’ room of manoeuvre through the lens of neorealism, 
Russia’s room of manoeuvre appears wider than Norway’s. Russia is larger and more 
powerful than Norway, and the bilateral relationship between the two is fundamentally 
asymmetrical. Russia does not necessarily have to pay attention to Norway’s security 
and economic interests in the region, whereas Norway, being the smaller of the two, 
has to be more sensitive to the interests of its big and powerful neighbour. It is 
important to stress that this interpretation is based on the theory that has been used, 
and its basic assumptions. Neorealism has traditionally been focused on great powers, 
such as the US and the Soviet Union (Mastanduno 1997: 50).  
 
7.2 The Perspective of Neoliberal 
Institutionalism    
Where neorealists see cooperation among states in an anarchic environment as 
difficult, neoliberal institutionalists consider cooperation between states to be possible, 
despite anarchy due to the neoliberal focus on absolute gains as opposed to relative 
gains. It does not matter what the other countries involved will gain, as long as 
absolute gains are reached individually by all the states involved. Not being motivated 
by zero – sum game mentality allows for cooperation to successfully take place 
(Powell 1991: 1303). In order for cooperation to take place, there must not exist 
harmony between the parties involved. Neoliberal institutionalism defines cooperation 
as an adjustment of behaviour vis-à-vis the expectations of others. To achieve such 
adjustment, the states that wish to enter cooperation need to have both common and 
conflicting interests (Axelrod and Keohane 1985: 226).  
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Where as Russia, as shown, is driven by its pursue of power and operates with a zero-
sum mentality, Norway conducts its foreign policy more within the lines of neoliberal 
institutionalism. This has largely to do with the fact that Norway is not a large, great 
country, and therefore has to rely on institutional norms and rules when seeking to 
promote its national interests. This is evident, especially in the High North and in 
Norway’s relations to Russia. Here, Norway relies in the United Nation’s Convention 
on the Law of the Sea from 1982. This is the convention that grants countries the right 
to establish exclusive economic zones and the sovereign right take advantage of the 
natural resources within these zones (St.mld.nr 15 (2008-2009): 43). The institution of 
the UN therefore acts as a protector of the rights of small states, such as Norway, and 
broadens Norway’s room of manoeuvre vis-à-vis Russia. If a cooperative relationship 
between Norway and Russia is rooted in an institutional framework and involves 
several other partners, this could widen Norway’s room of manoeuvre. This is because 
Norway would have multilateral and legal support, should Russia try to use its power 
status to try to squeeze Norway out of the cooperation or attempt to change the terms 
of the cooperation.   
 
Altering its own behaviour to achieve cooperation based on compromises with 
Norway is not something Russia portrays itself as willing to do. Looking back at 
chapter five, it was stated that Russia seeks to promote its own interests, regardless of 
the interests of others. This typical zero-sum approach can easily relate to neorealism, 
whereas neoliberal institutionalism assumes that states will give in to certain demands 
from others, in order to achieve cooperation. Will a cooperative situation between 
Russia and Norway become an arena where Russia, as the larger party can avoid 
adjusting its behaviour and interests whereas Norway, as the smaller part must give in 
to Russia’s demands and condition? When considering Russia’s cooperation with 
Sweden and Finland regarding gas pipelines, it is possible to argue that Russia is 
willing to accept the conditions of smaller states in order to make cooperation possible. 
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Sweden and Finland have recently agreed to let Russia install gas pipes through the 
countries’ economic zones down to Germany. The agreement was made after Russia 
had consented to accept several additional claims and conditions made by Sweden and 
Finland, than were originally intended (NRK 2009). It could thereby be likely to claim 
that Russia will consider Norway’s interests in the same way, an argument that would 
be in line with neoliberal assumptions. There is however no guarantee that Russia will 
follow up on all of its potential promises. It is also important to stress that Russia is 
likely to give in to the demands of smaller states only when the costs of not doing so 
appear higher than giving in.  
 
Neoliberal institutionalism states that in a situation of cooperation there will always be 
an asymmetrical form of dependency between the parties involved, in this case 
between Russia and Norway. Keohane and Nye write that the least dependent actor has 
the possibility to take advantage of its dominant position. They can use their power as 
the least dependent party, to twist the cooperative situation to their benefit, but also to 
achieve their goals in other policy areas (Keohane and Nye 1973: 160). The situation 
of today, which is prior to cooperation, may point to the assumption of Norway being 
the least dependent party, as it has the technology needed to develop Russia’s fields. 
But, as stressed above, this could change in an actual cooperative situation, leaving 
Norway as the more dependent of the two. Thereby, in line with neoliberal 
institutionalism, it would be in Russia’s power to take advantage of the situation. 
Using the same example as above, it is not unlikely to expect that should Norway get 
too involved in the Russian market, Russia will see this as an opportunity to take 
advantage of Norway’s weaker position. Hence, neoliberal institutionalism also argues 
in favour of a wide Russian room of manoeuvre, based on the dependency variable.  
 
Regarding the loyalty of NATO, the neoliberal institutionalists see the situation 
somewhat differently than neorealists. Mearsheimer has criticized neoliberal 
institutionalism for making a division between economic and security policy, where 
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the explanatory power of neoliberal institutionalism only applies to the latter. This has, 
in turn been answered, arguing that the theory is suitable when approaching 
cooperation regarding both economic policy and security policy (Keohane and Martin 
1995).  
 
Neorealism saw NATO as a tool that the US uses to achieve its own interests. This 
turns the institution into an instrument of the powerful member states. Neoliberal 
institutionalists, though, see institutions as more than reflections of the member states’ 
interests. They see institutions as an arena where its members shape and develop their 
own, common interests together (Keohane 1988: 382). Neoliberal institutionalists 
would argue that NATO would support Norway in a potential crisis with Russia. This 
will not be due to the US’ moral obligations or the belief in, and respect of, 
international norms (Keohane 1988: 380). It would be done simply out of the US’ own 
interest which will be shaped by NATO. It is hard to judge whether or not NATO will 
support Norway, as the organisation cannot be said to have a clear unitary foreign 
policy interest in the High North. Though the US is the largest of the NATO countries, 
the alliance has 27 other member states, many of which are EU countries (NATO 
2009). A large part of these EU countries import pipeline-delivered gas from Russia. 
As a consequence, they are highly depended of Russia and will probably not want to 
risk their relationship with Russia by supporting Norway in a potential High North 
conflict. On the other hand, the EU is eager to increase its import of Norwegian 
petroleum and keep Norway as an alternative source of energy. This wish is mainly a 
result of Russia’s unreliability as an energy provider, as was illustrated during the 
Ukraine – confrontation, where Russia stopped gas supplies to the country and 
consequently affected the gas delivery aimed at other European states (Løvås 2009). 
Paragraph 6.3 mentioned that it is unlikely for Norway to count on large support from 
the EU, as Norway itself is not a member of the union. Should Norway accept a EU 
membership before engaging in cooperation with Russia, it would receive support 
from the rest of the European countries and therefore gain a larger manoeuvre room. 
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Furthermore, the theory argues that international institutions provide an arena where 
sovereign, self-interested states may exchange information; lower transactions costs 
and build up certain expectations towards each other (Keohane 1989/1990: 737). This 
would remove the shadow of the future, in other words some of the uncertainty that 
dominate international relations because of the anarchic structure. It is, of course 
necessary that the information exchanged is reliable. As this thesis is dealing with 
energy and security policy, there will always be uncertainties concerning whether or 
not the information exchanged is reliable. However, Axelrod and Keohane argue that 
no matter the policy area, the most important is that the members of an institution 
build up certain expectations between them. Assuming that the rules of the institution 
are followed, rewards will be given in the form of a guarantee that other members will 
follow the same set of rules (Axelrod and Keohane 1985). This assumption reflects 
Norway’s motivation when it comes to contributing troops to Afghanistan through 
NATO. As earlier stated, Norway’s participation in Afghanistan may in turn provide 
US’ and NATO support in potential High North issues. Should the assumptions of 
neoliberal theory hold, it could be concluded that if Norway will stay loyal to NATO, 
NATO will in turn be loyal to Norway, and that Norway may count on the support of 
the institution. Thereby, neoliberal institutionalism has widened Norway’s room of 
manoeuvre in this regard and narrowed the one of Russia.  
 
This thesis has previously stressed that NATO has traditionally been seen as Norway’s 
hard power, whereas Russia has always relied on its own military forces. Considering 
the conclusions above, it can automatically be argued that Norway’s material power 
will be widened by NATO’s participation. It has on numerous occasions throughout 
this thesis been expressed that, though the Russian military capabilities are growing, 
they are not as large as they were during the Cold War. It is thereby questionable if 
Russia can stand against a united NATO and therefore reason to argue that Russia’s 
room of manoeuvre would shrink in case NATO involves itself heavily in a potential 
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conflict. Furthermore, Healey’s theorem assumes that merely a 5 per cent chance of 
NATO’s involvement would deter Russia and thereby enlarge Norway’s room of 
manoeuvre.  
  
As opposed to the result of the analysis based on neorealism, the one based on 
neoliberal institutionalism widens Norway’s room of manoeuvre and narrows Russia’s 
considerably. This is mainly due to the assumptions made by the neoliberal 
institutionalist theory. The result also reflects on the fact that by including institutions 
in its studies, neoliberal institutionalism has a wider ontological ground than 
neorealism. While neorealism has its ontological focus on states, neoliberal 
institutionalism also includes international institutions, thereby widening its 
explanatory area.  
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8 Concluding Remarks 
The task of this thesis was to examine how potential petroleum cooperation between 
Russia and Norway in the High North could affect the countries’ room of manoeuvre 
in the field of security policy. In order to accomplish the assignment, the thesis was 
conducted by using the method of theoretically interpretive case study. Empirical data 
was presented and analysed through the use of two theories, namely neorealism and 
neoliberal institutionalism. A clearly visible conclusion deriving from the neorealist 
and the neoliberal institutionalist analysis is that petroleum cooperation may influence 
the countries’ room of manoeuvre due to the nature of the dependency relationship 
between Russia and Norway, which is likely to be altered by cooperation.  
 
Both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists see cooperation as something that will 
alter the structure and intensity of dependency relations. The exchange of technology 
can change the dependency relationship in several ways. First of all because once 
Russia has received the technology, it will no longer need Norway’s assistance and 
might thereby exclude Norway from the cooperation.  
 
Secondly, the relationship might turn to Russia’s favour if the Norwegian technology 
industry becomes too involved in, and therefore highly dependent on, the Russian 
market in order to continue growing. Norwegian petroleum companies might become 
vulnerable to the unpredictable Russian way of doing business, as has previously been 
experienced by foreign companies such as Telenor. Thereby, Norway’s manoeuvre 
room would shrink while Russia’s would increase.  
 
The countries’ room of manoeuvre will be affected by the role played by NATO. A 
NATO that stands united with Norway will contribute to shrinking Russia’s room of 
manoeuvre vis-à-vis Norway, while widening Norway’s vis-à-vis Russia. If NATO 
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should choose not to follow up its obligations and support Norway in the High North, 
Russia’s room of manoeuvre would become greatly enlarged. Furthermore, Healey’s 
theorem assumes that merely a 5 per cent possibility of NATO’s involvement would 
deter Russia and shrink its room of manoeuvre, while enlarging Norway’s.   
 
According to neorealist assumption, NATO may not necessarily be willing to back 
Norway up in a potential confrontation with Russia, as doing so could run contrary to 
the national interests of at least some of its member countries, particularly those that 
depend heavily on Russian energy supplies. Neoliberal institutionalism, on the other 
hand, holds that NATO will support Norway. This support will be given, as 
neoliberalism stresses the importance of institutional rules and expectations among 
allies. If institutional assumptions hold, NATO will assist Norway in the High North 
as a return service for Norwegian military contributions in Afghanistan, among several 
other NATO operations. This conclusion is, of course, entirely based on theoretical 
assumptions, holding other variables fixed, not considering the actual, empirical 
situation of the day, in which it may be argued that the US will not be able to assist 
Norway as they are otherwise engaged in their own conflicts abroad.  
 
 
There is no way of determining exactly how the countries’ room of manoeuvre can be 
affected by petroleum cooperation. However, both theories indicate that the 
asymmetrical relationship between Russia and Norway could lead to the enlargement 
of Russia’s manoeuvre room. In any event, the safest way for Norway to limit the 
expansion of Russia’s room of manoeuvre is to either not engage in cooperation or to 
engage in a multilateral cooperation, where the US or the EU can act as a Norway’s 
partner vis-à-vis Russia. This thesis has thereby concluded that bilateral petroleum 
cooperation between Russia and Norway in the High North can result in a widening of 
Russia’s room of manoeuvre, as the asymmetrical relationship between the two 
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countries would dominate the situation. However, if cooperation is entered within a 
multilateral, institutional framework, it could be less likely that Norway would become 
exposed to Russia’s vague laws and changing terms.  
 
In addition to the form of the cooperation, namely whether it is bilateral or 
multilateral, the timing of the cooperation is also important. Even though Norway may 
appear to gain a lot of advantages during the start-up phase of cooperation, the country 
could be excluded from the project in the production phase. A scenario like this would 
leave Russia as the one gaining the most, as they would have gained access to the 
technology they needed and afterwards could continue production without Norwegian 
assistance. Also here, it is important for Norway to consider the cooperative terms 
before engaging in cooperation. An agreement built on norms and laws within an 
institutional framework would widen Norway’s room of manoeuvre, as the possibility 
of getting excluded from the project would be smaller. A cooperation not rooted in an 
institutional framework could give Russia a wider manoeuvre room, as they could use 
their position as a great power to manipulate the rules of the cooperation to their 
advantage.  
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